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I. INTRODUCTION

Sovereignty has been criticized as being of more value for oratory
purposes and persuasion than for science and law.' In 1993, Louis Henkin,
the then-president of the American Society for International Law, urged
that the word "sovereignty" be banished from polite or educated society.2
Today, in an era of globalization, of genocide, of rogue states, and of statesponsored terrorism, the nature and scope of sovereignty is being
challenged in all of its components.
Early on, sovereignty was the simple Hobbesian idea that the sovereign
had an undefeatable ability to determine the law and to have those
determinations obeyed. That is, to have the final word in matters of state.
1. MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCI, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN
STATE 21 (1995) (quoting QUINCY WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 277-78
(1968)).
2. Notes from the President, ASIL Newsletter 1, 6 (Mar. 1993).
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Traditionally, sovereignty vested the monarch with powers that would be
seen as absolute in the legal and political theory of the time. There was no
other institution that could erode the sovereign will. The idea was that the
sovereign always preceded law, and law represented nothing less than the
sovereign will.3 However, the sovereign himself was not subject to the
law. "[I]t is the distinguishing mark of the sovereign that he cannot in any
way be subject to the commands of another, for it is he who makes law for
the subject, abrogates law already made, and amends obsolete law."4
Today, sovereignty is anything but simple. There is disagreement as to
the nature of sovereignty, whether it is a relevant sort of concept in
geopolitics, and whether there is a one-size-fits all definition. Politics,
economics, culture, human rights law, the advent of international
institutions, the threat of nuclear annihilation, and the reality of
globalization itself in a rapidly changing world-all these elements
intersect to render sovereignty a complex subject.
In this Article my hope is to bring new understanding to the changing
character of sovereignty. We will examine four areas that have influenced
the weakening of traditional sovereignty. First, political strife can cause a
state to lose its grip on sovereign powers. A state may have sovereignty in
the legal sense of having control over its borders and of being recognized
in international relations, but may be unable to control its domestic affairs
due to erosion of political support from within, due to civil war,
insurrection, secessionist movements, or corruption. If things get bad
enough, as where the sovereign wages an unjust or illegal war,
international respect for that state's sovereignty could deteriorate, and
other states may find it necessary to intervene, either militarily or in less
drastic ways, and thereby usurp the autonomy that characterizes traditional
sovereignty.
Second, states have increasingly ceded some of their sovereign powers,
via treaties and other arrangements, to international institutions or
coalitions. Power-sharing arrangements, dealing with political, economic
and other issues, invariably shift the locus of sovereign power horizontally
from state authorities to external auspices.
Third, sovereignty has shifted vertically in that there are top-down
standards of good governance to which states are expected to conform
even if the underlying principles are contrary to the sovereign will.
Nonconformity with international standards of behavior will result in
3. See CARLScHMlTT, THECONCEPTOFTHEPOLTICAL38-39 (George Schwab trans., Univ.
of Chicago Press 1996) (1932).
4. JEAN BoIN, SIX BooKs OF THE CoMMoNwEALTH 28 (M.J. Tooley trans., Barnes &
Noble 1967) (1576).
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diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, international condemnation, or,
in the most egregious cases, humanitarian intervention.
Fourth, globalization, with the concomitant advance of information
technology and international commerce, is pushing toward a borderless
world, which makes it impossible for states to operate unfettered powers
of sovereignty. The "shrinking" size of the planet means that such issues
as the environment, nuclear weapons, disease and terrorism are of global
concern, because a crisis such as a pandemic that occurs wholly within one
state can still have rippling effects throughout the world.
Globalization also puts a spotlight on the first three elements. For
instance, civil rights abuse in the context of state domestic policy can no
longer be shielded from international scrutiny, due to the rapid spread of
news on the Internet-even in state regimes that control the media. If a
state engages in voting fraud or other corrupt practices, the world
community will quickly become aware of the situation, and international
watchdog groups, as well as other states, will apply vertical pressure on the
state to comply with international norms that discourage or outlaw the
practices in question.
Before we explore ways that sovereignty today has been whittled away,
it will be helpful to understand sovereignty as traditionally conceived. I
will then provide a working definition to be applied overall in this Article.
I will also explore the nature of the entity in which sovereignty can
manifest, namely the territorial unit known as the "state." After we have
explored these topics, I will turn to an analysis of how sovereignty has
been transformed, or eroded, depending on how you view it, along the
lines of the four categories previewed above.
II. COMPONENTS OF SOVEREIGNTY

A. TraditionalNotions of Sovereignty
Despite difficulty of understanding the term, sovereignty is a central
concept in international law. A variety of meanings of sovereignty has
been advanced in the course of a long and troubled history of grappling
with this term. When we think of the word sovereignty, several things
come to mind: control, autonomy, territory, power. The opposite of
sovereignty conjures up such ideas as foreign control, anarchy, disputed
territory, or a state occupied by enemy forces. Hobbes is often attributed
with the political notion of sovereignty. He suggested that implicit in
granting consent to be governed by a ruler is the social contract, the
creation of "that Mortall God,to which wee owe under the Immortal God,
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our peace and defence ... And he that carryeth this Person, is called
SOVERAIGNE, and said to have Soveraigne Power; and every one
besides, his SUBJECT."5
Sovereignty is classically defined as the "[s]upremacy of authority or
rule... [r]oyal rank, power, or authority... [tiotal independence and self
government....' The Oxford English Dictionarydefines sovereignty as
supremacy in respect of power, domination, or rank; supreme dominion,
authority, or rule. Traditionally, when states were under monarchical
government or dictatorships, sovereignty was exercised by the sovereign,
that is, one who held supreme rank above or authority over the population,
usually the monarch.7
Sovereignty itself is something that lies primarily dormant. When a
state is functioning smoothly and international relations are in good stead,
sovereignty is in hibernation. Not surprisingly, months if not years can
pass by without anything in particular arising that would challenge the
sovereign powers of a state. Where conflict erupts--either internally, with
guerilla warfare, secessionist movements, or the like-or externally, with
transnational, economic, political or other disputes, there may be fingerpointing with states accusing one another of abusing sovereign powers.
Sovereignty is usually associated with states. However, it is perfectly
proper to refer to sovereign rights with respect to municipalities,
provinces, and states within a larger state structure (e.g., individual states
of the United States), as well as the sovereign territories of Native
Americans. However, in our discussion we will explore sovereignty
primarily in the context of international territorial units rather than
subunits, of states.
Traditionally, the hallmark of sovereign authority was to declare or
wage war and, thereby, to contest the continued sovereignty of another
state.
An order of sovereign states, engaging in reciprocal and mutual acts
of international law creation, is also an order in which war is
recognized as a legitimate act of sovereignty. Under international
law during the modern era, sovereign states could be at peace or at
war. To be at war meant to contest the continued sovereignty of the
other-the aim might be, for example, annexation of a part or the
5. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 227-28 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968)

(1651) (emphasis in original).
6. WEBSTER IINEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1995).
7. However, even in a dictatorship, the commands that are issued originate from more than

one commanding authority. There are always a large number of actual lietenants of authority,
advisers, and others who influence the ruler himself.
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whole of the other state. Traditionally, this was expressed by saying
that the international order remains in a state of nature or is
anarchical. International law does not stand in place of war; it is
war stabilized. The point of stabilization is the regime of negative
sovereignty. 8
Today, the sovereign states no longer have a monopoly on the use of
violence to achieve political ends. For example, insurrectionists or
freedom fighters will engage in civil war against the state to achieve
secessionist or other political objectives, and terrorists will engage in
"terrorist war, [that] is part of a total war which sees the whole society as
an enemy, and all members of a society as appropriate objects for violent
action."9 Hare has commented that "[t]o some extent terrorism is a
substitute for conventional war."' 0 Terrorism and other political violence
by nonstate actors are similar to war insofar as the combatants attack the
political, social or economic structures of a given state."
The powers associated with sovereignty are not derived from an
affirmative grant of authority from, say the Constitution of a state, but are
inherent powers of statehood that have evolved in customary international
law. "The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make
treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they
had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested
in the
'2
federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.'
Certainly the principle of popular sovereignty has never been
explicitly identified by the U.S. Supreme Court as a rule of
recognition for our constitutional law. Nor do courts treat this
principle as a rule of recognition in reaching legal judgments about
the content of our constitutional law ....Furthermore, the U.S.
government appears to be legally entitled to exercise powers that
were never explicitly delegated to it by any discrete political act of
the people, such as the authority to establish and manage a central
banking system. And the federal government has exercised other
powers in the past never explicitly given to it by the people the

8. Paul W. Kahn, The Question of Sovereignty 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 259, 263 (2004).
9. Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, Defining Terrorism, Catholicism in Crisis (D.C. June 25, 1984)

(quoted excerpt available at http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Books/Sloan/Sloan.pdf).
10. R.M. Hare, On Terrorism, 13 J. VALUE INQUIRY 241,244 (1979).
11. RICHARDFALK, REVOLUTIONARIES AND FUNCTIONARIES: THE DUAL FACE OF TERRORISM
76, 90-93 (1988).
12. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,318 (1936).
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legality of which no one seriously questions now, such as the
authority to purchase land from other nations. 3
I think that an appealing way of considering sovereignty is that
suggested by Stephen Krasner, who divides sovereignty into four
components-international legal sovereignty (i.e., recognition,
Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence
sovereignty):
International legal sovereignty refers to the practices associated
with mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that
have formal juridical independence. Westphalian sovereignty refers
to political organization based on the exclusion of external actors
from authority structures within a given territory. Domestic

sovereignty refers to the formal organization of political authority
within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise
effective control within the borders of their own polity. Finally,
interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of public
authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people,
pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state. 4
This author goes on to explain:

13. Peter De Marneffe, Popular Sovereignty, Original Meaning, and Common Law
Constitutionalism, 23 LAW & PHIL 223, 240-41 (2004).
14. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY ORGANIZED HYpocRisy 3-4 (1999). Another
commentator puts these four elements into a slightly different narrative:
First, a sovereign state is one that enjoys supreme political authority and
monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its territory. Second, it is capable
of regulating movements across its borders. Third, it can make its foreign policy
choices freely. Finally, it is recognized by other governments as an independent
entity entitled to freedom from external intervention. These components of
sovereignty were never absolute, but together they offered a predictable
foundation for world order. What is significant today is that each of these
components-internal authority, border control, policy autonomy, and nonintervention-is being challenged in unprecedented ways.
Richard N. Haas, former ambassador and director of Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of
State, Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities, Remarks at the School of Foreign
Service and the Mortara Center for International Studies, Georgetown University, at 2 (Jan. 14,
2003), transcript available at http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/documents/haassovereignty_
20030114.pdf.
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International legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty involve
issues of authority and legitimacy, but not control. They both have
distinct rules or logics of appropriateness. The rule for international
legal sovereignty is that recognition is extended to territorial entities
that have formal juridical independence. The rule for Westphalian
sovereignty is the exclusion of external actors, whether de facto or
de jure, from the territory of a state. Domestic sovereignty involves
both authority and control, both the specification of legitimate
authority within a polity and the extent to which that authority can
be effectively exercised. Interdependence sovereignty is exclusively
concerned with control and not authority, with the capacity of a
state to regulate movements across its borders. I"
We will discuss international legal sovereignty in Part IV below.
International legal sovereignty, or recognition of states, is a distinct
concept from sovereign powers of a state. It has nothing to do with the
exercise of sovereign powers, but simply pertains to the political reality
that a state has garnered a degree of international respectability and that
other states recognize it for diplomatic, trade and other purposes, and in
turn recognize its sovereign as the relevant actor in international legal
relations.
B. Westphalian Sovereignty
Westphalian sovereignty is the type of sovereignty that is the most
well-known in academic discourse. The concept gains its name from the
Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which dealt with ending the Thirty Years
War.' 6 The treaty represented the concession of some power by the
emperor, with his claim of holy predominance, to numerous kings and
lords who wished to vigilantly protect their own feudal powers. The treaty
eventually stood for the notion of the absolute right of the sovereign to
exclude external actors from domestic authority.
Westphalian sovereignty means political autonomy or the right to be
left alone, so that no outsider may intermeddle, speak for the sovereign or
otherwise intervene in the internal or external affairs of a state without its
permission. Westphalian sovereignty "is also the right to be recognized as
an autonomous agent in the international system, capable of interacting

KRASNER, supra note 14, at 4.
16. The "Treaty of Westphalia" is the Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and
the King of France and Their Respective Allies, Oct. 24, 1648, available at http://fletcher.
tufts.edu/multi/texts/historical/westphalia.txt.

15.
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with other states and entering into international agreements." 7 It means
that religion and ideology are to be considered within the domestic
jurisdiction of each state rather than be a feature of international relations.
Westphalian sovereignty may be thought of as an absolute norm of
nonintervention, except by invitation, that is, "the basic prohibition against
foreign intervention which simultaneously imposes a duty of forbearance
and confers a right of independence on all statesmen. Since states are
profoundly unequal in power the rule is obviously far more constraining
for powerful states and far more liberating for weak states." 8
In 1953, President Eisenhower described Westphalia sovereignty when
he said: "Any nation's right to a form of government and an economic
system of its own choosing is inalienable.Any nation's attempt to dictate
to other nations their form of government is indefensible."'9
C. Domestic Sovereignty
Another kind of sovereignty is domestic sovereignty, which
contemplates that the domestic policy choices made by leadership are
unfettered by external constraints. This, to some extent, overlaps or can be
conflated with Westphalian sovereignty. If a sovereign is free to
implement domestic policies or otherwise exercise domestic political
authority within the state, this necessarily implies that the sovereign is free
from external constraints and thereby acts without deference to any claim
of legal superiority by any other state.2" The subtle distinction is that
domestic sovereignty involves the ability of the sovereign to carry on
domestic policy free from internal constraints such as political
insurrection, civil strife, or loss of confidence by a significant portion of
the population.
Domestic sovereignty has a zone of authority that transcends a state
territory. Numerous criminal laws have jurisdictional reach outside the
borders of a state, particularly laws applied to citizens of the state living
abroad. And a state may exercise certain powers on the high seas on board
ships that sail under its flag, despite the fact that the high seas is not the
territory of any state, and never can be.

17. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Orcer, 40 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 283, 284 (2004).
18. ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
THE THIRD WORLD 6 (1990).
19. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 28 (Apr. 27, 1953), at 599.
20. As Chief Justice John Marshall said in Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. 116,
136 (1812), "the jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and
absolute."
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D. InterdependenceSovereignty
A final type of sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, pertains to
the ability of sovereigns to control the flow of "information, ideas, goods,
people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state,"'"
autonomously and independently of other states. The main element here
is the ability of the state to secure and control its borders from
unauthorized incursions. Today, the borders of most states have become
increasingly permeable, and, therefore, open to external influences.
Technically, any invasion of a state's borders, even if it occurs in a vast
area of hinterland with little or no population, attacks the sovereignty of
the state, for at minimum the invasion threatens the integrity of the
borders, and the state ability to control the flow of people and commerce
through the borders. The basic theme of Westphalian

sovereignty-supreme and exclusive authority free from external
constraints-permeates the other species of sovereignty. The various types
of sovereignty overlap in that they all pertain to the ability of the state to
control events within its borders in one way or another.
E. Who Exercises Sovereign Powers?

Sovereign powers are exercised by those people who are authorized to
so act,' with the further provision that they remain in firm command of
the apparatus of government. There can be fluidity as to who or what
group has the authority to exercise sovereign powers.
In democracies, sovereign powers are allocated among branches of
government, as we will explore in Part VII.A. 1 below. In an earlier era,
sovereign power was vested with the royal sovereign. "Monarchs were the
sovereigns to whom dignity belonged in eras when ordinary persons were
' Today, in some trouble spots around
not due such respect and deference."23
the world, such as Somalia, Rwanda, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri
Lanka, and Kashmir, there are occasions where the government must cede
21. KRASNER, supra note 14, at 3-4.
22. In this regard, the Supreme Court has said:
[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone
negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress
itself is powerless to invade it. As Marshall said in his great argument of March
7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, the President is the sole organ of the
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
23. Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REv. 2029 (2003).
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power into the hands of individual warlords "who are both well armed and
apparently free to behave both irresponsibly and just as they please."'2 4
Often enough in African states, on a local level it is often tribal leaders
who decide domestic law.2" For example, Zulu leaders insist on adhering
to ancient tribal customs that enforce virginity testing and female genital
cutting, while a comprehensive protocol on women rights, ratified by
fifteen African nations, prohibits these practices. 6 In Guinea, female
genital cutting has been a crime since 1965, yet tribal leaders interpret
their traditional law as overriding civil and criminal states of the
Parliament."
The sovereign need not be actually located within the territorial
boundaries of the state in order to exercise sovereign powers, but can
legally carry out various acts outside the state territory. Of course, waging
war is an obvious example. Also, the head of a state during his stay in a
foreign state, may conclude international treaties, promulgate laws, or
appoint or remove officials by putting his signature on the documents
concerned.
Sovereignty is something that "survives" regime changes of a state.
The powers devolve with little or no gap in authority on whoever succeeds
as the head of state. If a head of state is deposed by a coup d' tat, the world
community may still regard the deposed leader as the head of state in
absensia,but it would be improper to say that the deposed leader possesses
sovereign powers. The aggressors who engineered the coup will have de
facto control of the government, most importantly the military apparatus.
They will be the ones to whom sovereign powers have passed, for the
leader in exile no longer has control of the apparatus of government, much
less control of the territory of the state. If, following a coup, an enemy
power takes advantage of the instability by invading the country and
seeking to overthrow those who are in de facto control, this incursion is a
threat to the sovereignty of the state despite the fact that the de facto
leaders seized power illegally, and despite the fact that the leader in exile,
whom the world community may still regard to be the legitimate sovereign
of the state, is not the object of the attack.
In this regard, the U.S. Supreme Court has said:

24. Robert Jennings, Sovereignty and International, in
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

STATE,

SOVEREIGNTY,

AND

30 (Gerard Kreijen ed., 2002).

25. See Sharon LaFraniere, Women's Rights Laws and African Custom Clash, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 2005, at Al.
26. See id.
27. See id.
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Rulers come and go; governments end and forms of government
change; but sovereignty survives. A political society cannot endure
without a supreme will somewhere. Sovereignty is never held in
suspense. When, therefore, the external sovereignty of Great Britain
in respect of the colonies ceased, it immediately passed to the
Union.28

As mentioned, traditionally the sovereign was thought to be a kind of
divinity, and, as such, the sovereign was above civil law rather than
subject to it. The sovereign had the power to make laws, and since the
sovereign made laws he was not bound by those laws.29 Therefore, the
sovereign always precedes law. ° The law is supposed to be aligned with
the sovereign's will, and it is the sovereign's duty in the first instance to
maintain the law. But at the same time, the sovereign could maintain some
"distance" from the law, and on an ad hoc basis repeal or reshape the law.
"[I]t is the distinguishing mark of the sovereign that he cannot in any way
be subject to the commands of another, for it is he who makes law for the
subject, abrogates law already made, and amends obsolete law."'" This
notion of the "uncommanded-commander" was expressed by Hobbes:
It is true that sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature,
because such laws be divine and cannot by any man or
Commonwealth be abrogated. But to those laws which the
sovereign himself-that is, which the Commonwealth-maketh he
is not subject. For to be subject to laws is to be subject to the
Commonwealth-that is, to the sovereign representative-that is,
to himself, which is not subjection but freedom from the laws.
Which error, because it setteth the laws above the sovereign, setteth
also a judge above him and a power to punish him; which is to
make a new sovereign; and again for the same reason a third to
punish the second; and so continually without end, to the confusion
and dissolution of the Commonwealth. 2
The sovereigns of Hobbes' era may well have been guided by transcendent
principles of morality. For example, in the book of Proverbs, European
princes must have taken note: "By me kings reign, and rulers decree

28. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936).
29. See J.L. BRERLY, THE LAWS OFNATIONS 7 (1955).
30. See SCHMrrT, supra note 3, at 38-39.
31. See BODIN, supra note 4, at 28.
32. See HOBBES, supra note 5, at 254-55.
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justice. By me princes rule, and nobles, all the judges of the earth. 3 3 "It is
an abomination for kings to commit wickedness, for a throne is established
by righteousness." 34 "A ruler who lacks understanding is a great oppressor,
but he who hates covetousness will prolong his days."35
The sort of divine authority vested with the sovereign of the past is in
contrast to today's approach, in which leaders of nations can be brought
before international tribunals to account for crimes against humanity, or
be subjected to impeachment proceedings in their own countries.
Ill. COMPONENTS OF STATEHOOD

A. Overview
In order to better understand sovereignty we should appreciate that
sovereignty is not inevitably linked with that particular independent
territorial unit known as the state, although in some situations, we will see
that sovereignty is reposed in other types of entities that lack independence
or lack territoriality.
The definition of a "state" is problematic for several reasons. First, the
word is sometimes broadly used in the sense of denoting "society," or
some special form of society, such as with the sentence, "The Saudi
Arabian people constitute an Islamic state," or "Brazil is a Spanishspeaking state." We refer to "American" or "Chinese" society as if the
boundaries of a state are also invariably the boundaries of some social or
political unit.
Second, sometimes references to "the state" can be confusingly vague,
or overly broad, as with the sentence, "The state is committed to
cooperating with the weapons inspectors." Does this mean that the entire
state government is sympatico with the commitment, or that a particular
branch of government is, or that the voters have expressed their sentiment
on the point? It might be more accurate to say that "the President is
committed to cooperating with the weapons inspectors," or "the legislature
has passed a resolution urging the President to cooperate with the weapons
inspectors."
Third, the term is sometimes used in the sense of the geographic
territory occupied by a state, as in saying "This area is the State of Israel,"
or "The Netherlands is a low-lying state."
33. Proverbs 8:15-16.
34. Proverbs 16:12.
35. Proverbs28:16.
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So, just what does it mean for an entity to be a "state"? The following
three elements describe statehood as: (1) a geographic terrain with
boundaries that are recognized or at least not disputed by the weight of
authority in the international community; (2) a population primarily of
citizens who more or less identify this territory as their "homeland"; and
(3) a form of governance that operates on a day-to-day basis with some
measure of authenticity, effectiveness, and validation by the people. We
could say there is an "organic unity" associated with statehood, unity of
place, of population, and of government. They must all be present at the
same time in order for statehood to exist.
In one sense the state is a tangible object, and in another sense it has an
intangible character. It cannot be apprehended by the senses, yet it does
occupy a precise geographic location that can be measured in square miles
and described by longitude and latitude. But the state is not identical with
its geographic boundaries. The state is not "comprised" of the individual
members of its population, yet the population lives "in" the state.
A state, of course, cannot "act" by itself because it is not "animate." Its
actions depend on human agency, just as with other juridical entities. Yet
we say that there are "acts of state," that certain action is "taken by the
state," that "the state has signed a treaty," that a state has "certain
problems," that a state is "friendly" (or "unfriendly"), and in numerous
other contexts we anthropomorphize human characteristics upon the state.
Once a territorial entity has secured for itself certain borders, a
reasonably stable population, and a government that garners some measure
of recognition within, this state of affairs results in statehood, not
sovereignty. Sovereignty is a consequence of statehood, but once a state
is born sovereignty does not always follow. Statehood is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for sovereignty to manifest.
B. The Territory of a State
Sovereignty contemplates that the state occupies a defined physical
territory "within which domestic political authorities are the sole arbiters
of legitimate behavior."36 A necessary feature of statehood is that the entity
claiming statehood must lay claim to and occupy boundaries that are not
in serious dispute in the international community. Thus, if a territory is in
dispute, as with Kashmir between Pakistan and India, the international
community will not regard the area as being a state. In a real sense, the
exercise of sovereign powers depends on the state retaining a firm hold on
its location. Normally, "[t]he territory of a state furnishes the title for the

36. Slaughter, supra note 17, at 284.
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competence of the state: it is mainly within this territory that the state
exercises its functions.""a
A state can come into possession of territory by lawful or unlawful
means. Often enough, the territorial integrity of a state is a product of
conquest-a wrestling of territory from people who lay an earlier claim to
it but who have suffered military defeat. This is a kind of "adverse
possession" on a large scale. As Oppenheim has asserted, the annexation
of conquered territory "confers a title only after a firmly established
conquest. 3 8 He goes on to say: "[A] State is considered to be the lawful
owner even of those parts of its territory of which originally it took
possession wrongfully and unlawfully, provided that the possessor had
been in undisturbed possession for such a length of time as is necessary to
create the general conviction that the present order of things is in
conformity with international order., 39 Thus, it is an axiom of international
law that "the formation of a new State is... a matter of fact, and not of
law." That is, where a state exists, the legality of its creation, or how it
acquired its territory, is irrelevant to the question of whether the state
effectively exists. All that seems to matter is whether, once a firmly
established conquest occurs, the conqueror has mustered up some measure
of support or approval from the people at large, including some of the
vanquished who may continue to live in the region.
C. A Stable Populationof Citizens
Sovereignty is also dependent upon certain social realities associated
with statehood. A necessary condition for statehood is that there is a
reasonably stable community of people who live in the state. The
community must not be just any community of people thrown into
relationship with each other. They must consider themselves to be
members of the same state. This implies that the population is more or less
unified in its sentiment concerning the legitimacy of the government,
although they may disagree as to the wisdom of acts taken by it.
In addition, there may well be people who live in the state transiently,
and immigrants who have or aspire to attain permanent residence. It is not
crucial that the entire population identify with a common culture and
history. Much of the population will regard the country as their homeland
and enjoy a sense of nationalism and patriotism, and others will not.
37. INGRID DETTER DE LuPis, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 5 (Gower
Publishing Company, Ltd., 1987).
38. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 450 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992).
39. Id. at 456.
40. Id.at 624.
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A society of people, being a component of statehood, cannot be
confused with statehood. That is, it would be improper to refer to "the
American people" as the juristic entity, "America." Moreover, to do so
would be underinclusive because much of the population consists of
people who are not Americans but who are permanent residents, while a
great number of Americans reside outside of the country.
Moreover, a population of nomads (e.g., modem day gypsies), or a
population in exile-such as refugees who have fled a region due to war,
famine, or pestilence-does not constitute a state. The individual citizens
in exile remain citizens of their former state, from which they are
temporarily separated and to which they hope to return.
D. The Formationof Government

An entity, to be a state, must have some form of governance that is
effective. The concept of statehood contemplates that there is a monopoly
of power vested with a certain authority, namely the "government." For a
state to function, the government must be effective in garnering some
measure of public support and acceptance. The manner of exercise of
power and the distribution of that power will depend on the mode of
governance. For instance, in a dictatorship, the locus of authority will be
in the commands of the single ruler, whose will may be imposed upon the
population. The dictator will is made "in the name of the state," even
though many might not endorse the commands of the tyrant, but submit
due to necessity.
E. DistinctionBetween "Government" and "State"
It seems to me that often enough, and incorrectly so, we speak of "the
government" and "the state" as synonymous. We say that "the
government" has implemented a certain law, and we think that this is the
same as saying that "the state" has done so. But there are coherent
differences between these terms.
The state is logically successive in time to government; that is, a
government is a prerequisite to statehood, and may be formed by actors in
a territorial unit that is not a state, such as a colony or a newly found
wilderness territory. The birth of a state may or may not follow. The
viability and stability of a government will usually not be known until
some period of time has elapsed. If the government is ineffective in that
it fails to garner public support, this crucial feature of statehood will not
be satisfied. A state comes into being
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if an independent government has established itself by issuing a
coercive order for a certain territory and if the government is
effective, i.e., if the government is able to obtain permanent
obedience to its order on the part of the individuals living in its
territory.41

The government is, for the most part, the organ by which the state acts
both domestically and in entering relations with other states. In some
situations, such as in England, it is the action of the Prime Minister in
filling up the offices of the ministry, that forms the government.
"State" is a neutral term that discloses nothing about the nature of the
government. States can have entirely different types of government, for
those who work to form a government are free to institute for themselves
any government they wish, provided thereby that other states' rights are
not violated and that the government is effective and garnering some
measure of support from the population. The state's government type can
change, while the state remains the same juristic entity, just as the type of
business of a corporation can change, while the corporate identity remains
intact.
Gramatically, it is more proper to speak of "action of the state" rather
than "action of the government" because "government" is not really a
tangible noun (person, place or thing) but is an ideology. A state is not an
ideology, but is a thing, that is, a juristic entity. Once a government
becomes viable, it is government of a state and is operated by the state.
Other entities of the state, such as the court system, are said to be "in, of
and for" the state, as in the expression, "the Supreme Court in, of and for
the State of California."
Finally, a state can exist without a government (e.g., a state in anarchy),
whereas government cannot exist without a state that it governs.
F. The State Entity Comparedto the CorporateEntity
Statehood is analogous to the legal entity of the corporation. Like a
corporation, a state is not self-begotten. It is caused to come into existence;
it is created by human beings. It has a beginning and may well have
perpetual longevity. Actions of the state, like those of a corporation, occur
at the hands of its human agents. The state, like a corporation, is legally
responsible for actions taken under its authority.
The identity of a state can remain the same even though its population
(shareholders) changes, and even though it grows in territory ("diversifies"
or "merges"). Its legal status is closely associated with whether or not a
41. HANS KELSON, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 219 (1945).
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constitution or founding document (articles of incorporation) has been
established that sets forth its mode of governance, distribution of power,
and rights and duties of the branches of government (the officers, board of
directors, and shareholders). The state, like the corporation, holds title to
various kinds of property and must act as steward, in a fiduciary sense, of
the property.
The differences between a corporation and a state are as follows: The
corporation is a creation of the state, authorized and regulated by statutory
law, whereas a state is an entity whose validity is construed according to
customary international law. A state's powers, that is, sovereign powers,
are likewise a product of customary international law. If certain criteria are
in place, the international community will acknowledge that a state has
been created, whereas the creation of a corporation depends upon the
application of domestic law.
The creation, dissolution and sphere of validity of a corporation are
governed by the state, or more precisely, by the state laws on the subject.
A domestic corporation is a citizen of the state, has a domicile, an address,
a taxpayer ID number, and is subject to civil and criminal suit. A state is
traditionally immune from litigation based on the principle of sovereign
immunity, although in modem times most states have enacted laws to
allow tort and contract claims, among other actions, to be instituted against
the state.
The point in time at which an entity acquires statehood usually cannot
be ascertained precisely, whereas the time at which a corporation is formed
is quite straightforward. It seems that there is a seamless process by which
the international community gradually comes to regard an entity as having
attained the status of statehood. There are, of course, cases where the birth
of a state can be pinpointed in time, as occurred when Israel was formed
by international agreement in 1948.
G. The Equality of States

The idea of equality of states was introduced into international law by
Vattel in Le droitde gens, first published in 1758. Vattel reasoned that if
in the Hobbesian state of nature, men were equal, then this principle
should have application to states that are formed by men. While the notion
of sovereign equality is a legal principle, it is somewhat of a fiction in
application because of power asymmetries that in fact influence and
constrain the exercise of sovereignty. Weaker states must often change
their domestic policies to comply with international rules or conditions
that are established, for the most part, by powerful states. In addition, some
states are weaker than others in their ability to participate in, influence, or
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dominate international legal processes. India, China and Canada reliably
exercise sovereign powers over domestic policy and borders, but have a
limited capacity to engage in global lawmaking.
IV.RECOGNITION OF STATES

Recognition of states, formally known as international legal
sovereignty, is a distinct concept from sovereign powers of a state. Once
a state comes into existence, it is a further question whether the state is
recognized by other states. The act of recognition is a political act, and in
no way confers or constitutes the legal existence a state. Political
recognition presupposes the legal existence of the state in question.
While recognition is referred to as "international legal sovereignty," to
my mind this is a misnomer, in that recognition does not acknowledge that
the state has attained a particular threshold of sovereign powers. Rather,
recognition answers the question of whether the state is established as a
viable political entity in the international system, whether it is accepted as
a juridical "equal," whether its representatives are entitled to diplomatic
immunity, and whether it can join international organizations and enter
into treaties and compacts with other states. "Under the traditional
approach of governmental recognition, the government must be in defacto
control of the territory and the means of administration, have the
acquiescence of the population, and indicate its willingness to comply with
the state international obligations."42
States of course prefer to garner international recognition than to be in
the nonrecognized status:
Nonrecognition is not a bar to the conduct of commercial and even
diplomatic discourse, but it can introduce an element of uncertainty
into the calculations of actors. Ex ante they may -not be able to
predict how particular governments or national court systems will
respond to an unrecognized government. Multinational firms might
be more reluctant to invest. a3
Recognition is ticket of general admission to the international arena."
Recognition by other states, particularly by stronger states, can reinforce
42. Captain Davis Brown, The Role of Regional Organizationsin Stopping Civil Wars, 41
A.F. L. REV.235, 269 (1997).
43. KRASNER, supranote 14, at 16.
44. MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULUE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN
STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPuCATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 12 (1995).
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the position of rulers by signaling to constituents that the ruler has access
to international resources, including political alliances and trade
opportunities. Recognition can pave the way for membership in
international organizations, some of which provide financial aid, facilitate
the conclusion of treaties, and increase the chances that state initiatives
will not be challenged in other countries' courts because the act of state
doctrine and the principle of sovereign immunity will apply. Recognition
can enhance the ability of leaders to promote the interests of their
constituents, and hence enhances their domestic political support.
Recognition is analogous to befriending another person: in this
construction, one acquires a stable identity of the other, achieved in some
social context. There is a relationship that links one another and leads to
mutual gains.
Sometimes a state will fail to garner recognition by more powerful
states even though it has a stable population, secure borders and a wellentrenched government with a firm command over domestic policies.
Generally, recognition of a state implies acceptance of the authenticity and
legitimacy of the government of that state. Sometimes there may be a
qualified sort of recognition. For instance, Cuba is unquestionably a state
and exercises numerous sovereign powers. At the same time, numerous
other states refuse to engage in diplomatic relations with Cuba because of
objections to the state mode of governance. Similarly, the United States
regards Iran and North Korea as "rogue" states, but does not deny that
these states have sovereign powers and are entitled to membership along
with other states in the United Nations.
Once a state has been recognized as such by a significant portion of the
international community, it may well be that sovereignty in its various
forms may also be in place. But this is not necessarily so. The recognition
may or may not suggest that the state has full sovereign powers. More
likely, the recognition is simply a confirmation that the elements of
statehood-territorial unity, population stability and effective
governance-are such that it would be appropriate to carry on friendly
relations with the state.
States have continued to recognize governments out of power,
including Mexican recognition of the Spanish republican regime until
1977, and recognition of the Chinese Nationalist regime by the major
Western powers until the 1970s. On the other hand, states have refused to
recognize new governments that have established effective control, such
as: the British refusal in the nineteenth century to recognize the newly
independent Latin American states until a decade after they had
established effective control, the British refusal to recognize the
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Declaration of Independence until after the Revolutionary War, and the
U.S. refusal to recognize the Soviet regime until 1934.
V. NONSTATE ENTITIES SOMETIMES HAVE SOVEREIGN POWERS
Statehood is usually, but not always, a necessary condition to legal
sovereignty. Entities that have lacked one or more of the features
associated with statehood-a defined territory, a permanent population, an
autonomous government in effective control, or the capacity to enter into
relations with other states-have operated quite adequately and have
sometimes hardly been regarded as anything less than legally sovereign.
A. SituationsInvolving Recognition of a Government Only
In some situations entities that lack features of statehood have been
accorded international legal sovereignty; that is, recognition of a
government, but nothing more. Examples include the German and Italian
recognition of the Franco regime in 1936 and the American recognition of
the Lon Nol government in Cambodia in 1970. The Member States of the
Federal State of Germany before World War I retained the right to send
and receive diplomats even though the authority structure lacked formal
autonomy. The reigning monarchs of these states were still treated as if
they were the monarchs of fully independent entities.
B. Entities Lacking Autonomous Government
India was allowed to join the League of Nations while it was still a
colony of Britain. India and the Philippines were founding members of the
United Nations even though they did not become formally independent
until 1946 and 1947 respectively. In 1974, the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) was given permanent observer status in the United
Nations. A number of states recognized the PLO and gave diplomatic
status to its local office. When the declaration of Palestine independence
was issued in 1988, the PLO was upgraded to observer mission
status,
45
though the PLO did not have independent control over territory.
In 1967, the United Kingdom created the concept of an associated state,
something between a state and a colony, for some of its Caribbean
possessions. For a number of years, these associated states (Antigua,
Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, St. Christopher, Nevis and
Anguilla) possessed internal autonomy, while Britain had control over
their foreign affairs. These entities joined multilateral organizations such
45.

OPPENHEIM,

supranote 38, at 163-64 n.1O.
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as the Economic Commission for Latin America. Eventually these entities,
with the exception of Nevis (which reverted back to being a colony)
asserted full sovereignty and ended their special relationship with Britain.
Similarly, New Zealand retains control over foreign policy of the Cook
Islands, and the latter is in control of its domestic affairs. The Cook Islands
has been permitted to join various international organizations, including
the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization,
the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the Asian Development
Bank. 46
Before World War I, the Member States of the Federal State of
Germany retained the right to send and receive diplomats. The monarchs
of these states were treated as if they were the monarchs of fully
independent states.
Andorra, a territory located in the Pyrenees between France and Spain,
has international legal sovereignty even though it is not autonomous. Since
the thirteenth century its constitutional structure has provided for
coprinceps, initially the bishop of Urgel in Spain and the king of France.
The citizens of Andorra adopted their first formal constitution in 1993 with
the approval of the coprinceps, now the governments of France and Spain.
Article 66 gives the coprinceps the right to participate in treaty
negotiations involving internal security and defense, diplomatic
representation, and judicial cooperation. A treaty cannot be adopted unless
it is approved by the representatives of both Andorra and the coprinceps.
Andorra is a member of the United Nations despite the fact that it lacks
juridical autonomy in light of the extraterritorial authority conferred on the
coprinceps.
Hong Kong, though a British colony and then part of China, became a
founding member of the World Trade Organization even though China
was not.
In 1955, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom recognized
the Federal Republic of Germany as having the "full authority of a
sovereign state over its international and external affairs," but the allies
retained certain powers, including the right to declare a state of emergency
in all or part of Germany, the retention of full rights with regard to Berlin,
and the reservation of full authority with regard to Germany as a whole,
unification, and a final peace settlement. These residual rights did not end
until the final peace settlement with Germany in 1990."7
Other, more curious, arrangements have been accorded international
legal sovereignty. The Knights Hospitaler of St. John of Jerusalem of
Rhodes and of Malta (the Order of Malta) is recognized as a sovereign
46. Id. at 280-84.
47. Id. at 137.
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entity by more than sixty states even though it lost control of Malta in
1798 and holds no territory other than some buildings in Rome. It
originally was an order of Crusader knights that was recognized as a
sovereign entity when it conquered Rhodes in 1310. In 1530, Emperor
Charles V gave the Order the island of Malta for the minimal rent of one
falcon per year (the Maltese falcon) as well as a commitment that it
garrison Tripoli on the North African coast. In 1798 Napolean drove out
the Order from Malta, and it has not been in control of any independent
territory since.
Nonetheless, the Order has maintained diplomatic relations with
Austria and with some smaller Italian states as well. The Order presently
is engaged in charitable work, and is recognized as a sovereign state by
many conventional sovereign states. In the mid-1990s it had embassies in
fifty-nine countries.
Thus, while statehood is usually the first step towards acquiring
sovereign powers, there is no hard-and-fast rule as to what political entities
might gain sovereign powers, either by way of recognition (international
legal sovereignty) or other forms of sovereignty mentioned.
C. Newly Emergent States may Undergo a Periodof SharedSovereignty
States that are newly emancipated from colonial authority will usually
undergo a transition period during which domestic state institutions are
developed. The newly emergent state may rely on the laws of its colonial
parent, and there will likely be a power-sharing arrangement, that is,
shared sovereignty, with the parent state. Sometimes a new state may be
incapable of exercising effective authority, or the new state existence may
create a destabilizing dynamic in the region, so that there may be
prolonged international administrative and/or military presence that
constrains the sovereignty of the new state. Until domestic state
institutions have become effective, the state level of Westphalian
sovereignty and domestic sovereignty will be at an ebb.
For example, pursuant to the 1995 Dayton Accords, which ended the
Bosnian conflict with Serbia, Bosnia was to share sovereign powers with
an international High Representative from a Western European country
and with a NATO-led force to ensure security. This oversight function was
considered necessary to protect the territorial integrity of Bosnia because
the Republica Srpska was pushing for secession.
Sometimes a new state will be a former substate entity that has seceded
from the parent state, either peacefully or after a long military struggle. In
the end, what develops within a peace process is usually a gradual and
conditional devolution of sovereign powers, or shared sovereignty,
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between the parent state and the substate entity, under international
supervision. During this transition there may be institution building,
phased sovereignty, conditional sovereignty and either the attainment of
full sovereignty in the substate entity or some kind of constrained
sovereignty. In some instances the substate entity may not acquire
independence, but obtain
authority to operate within a stable system of
48
autonomy.
heightened
VI. PRESSURES FROM WITHIN A STATE THAT UNDERMINE SOVEREIGNTY

A. The Legal Status of the State Usually Remains Intact
Despite Upheavals
The requirement that a stable form of government be in place for a state
to exist does not mean that if the government undergoes a period of
instability at a later time, "statehood" will somehow be nullified. Neither
a coup nor other regime change, in and of itself, will abrogate the legal
status of the state. Usually it takes much more to abrogate a state qua state,
such as conquest by a foreign enemy.
Boundary disputes, disruption, corruption, civil disobedience, or other
instability that a state undergoes will erode the sovereign powers of the
state, but not the legal validity of the state entity itself. For example,
conflicts with a neighboring state can in some instances cast into doubt
former geographic claims of the disputing states. Thus, a longstanding
dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia has cast a pall over their respective
border claims. Similarly, Chad and Sudan have both been sieged with
rebels within their respective states, and this has erupted into violence
across their porous borders.49 But the international community still regards
these countries as states. What has been impacted is the ability of these
states to exercise sovereign control over their borders.
A state continues to exist despite changes in the form of government.
For example, the Declaration of Independence declared the independence
of the American colonies from Britain, at which point the United States of
America was born. At that time, the Union existed and operated for several
years under the Articles of Confederation. Once the Constitution was
48. The process is a delicate matter, especially where there are concerns relating to the
protection of majority group members who might become a minority within the new state. There
may also be concern on the impact that independence of the substate entity may have on the
economic and political processes of the parent state.
49. See Lydia Polgreen, Chadian Rebels Kill 100; ChadBlames Sudan,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,
2005, at A10.
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formed, the Union became a "more perfect Union," and acquired a new
system of government.5 ° The change in the structure of government did not
change the Union's legal status or identity.
If a government is overthrown by a military coup, and the former
leaders are removed from power, the state entity remains the same despite
the fact that there may be a period of no effective government, anarchy or
revolutionary changes in government.
A recent example was the American-led invasion of Iraq, in which
there was a regime change, a period of power-sharing, and eventually an
entirely new constitution and government were assimilated into the same
state, with no change in the population structures or borders, and retention
of the same juristic state known as Iraq. What happens in such instances
is that there is an attack from outside on the competence of a state
government. This is in effect an interference with the sovereignty of that
state. What is interesting about this case is that the ability of the new
government to exercise sovereign powers has been somewhat thwarted by
insurgents from within-indeed a civil war-who have made it difficult
for the government to effectively implement democratic reforms.
B. CircumstancesInvolving Instability of Population,
Borders or Governance
While the existence of a state qua state is rarely negated even though
some components of statehood might be at risk, sovereignty has a hard
time flourishing if these same components are under siege. If the features
of statehood-population solidarity, geographic solidarity, and
government solidarity-come apart, sovereignty will suffer in one way or
another. To erode one component imperils a state's capacity to exercise
sovereign authority. The sum of the three is greater than its parts.
A variety of circumstances may converge to undermine one or more of
these components. Sovereignty undergoes great challenges if the
population is unstable or displaced, if the state geography is challenged or
if the government is ineffective and has lost popular support. Even an
effective government-that is a government that has significant support
among its citizens-may itself be a source of the erosion of its
sovereignty, particularly Westphalian sovereignty, if corruption or tyranny
induces the international community to question its ability to fulfill moral
duties of governance and presses for accountability. Also, warring
factions, secessionist movements and other rallying cries for freedom
inevitably threaten the state's ability to exercise sovereign powers. Really,

50. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936).
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almost any challenge from within the society can lead to political
fragmentation significant enough to put sovereignty under pressure.
For instance, a separatist movement may garner momentum, and
foment domestic unrest. Some portions of the country may be taken over
by rebels, and this geographic terrain will be severed from sovereign
control of the state; domestic borders in another part of the country may
be rendered insecure, thus threatening the integrity of the state territory,
and thereby erode interdependence sovereignty. The dissidents may seek
to overthrow the powers that be, and if a significant sub-national group
ceases to consider itself part of the parent state, this may inevitably erode
confidence in the state leadership. The need to divert resources to quell the
rebels and to deal with the erosion of confidence will interfere with the
government ability to exercise domestic sovereignty. There may be a mass
displacement of population. The government may be unable to cope with
the situation, so that international peace-keeping forces may need to
occupy hot spots, and humanitarian NGOs may need to come into the
country to render aid. Such action is a clear challenge to both Westphalian
and domestic sovereignty.
There are many other situations that can erode features of statehood
and, in turn, impair sovereignty, such as famine, sectarian conflicts,
official corruption or simply ineffective government. 1 If a state loses its
grip on the ability to repress drug use, minimize corruption, control crime,
collect taxes, build dams, provide social services, the breakdown of the
government effectiveness in tending to infrastructure suggests that
domestic sovereignty is on the wane. It may not be entirely clear which
comes first, the erosion of domestic sovereignty or the government
ineffectiveness, as they often go hand in hand.
In Sri Lanka, pockets of citizens associated with the Tigers of Tamil,
the ethnic separatist group that has fought for an independent Tamil nation
for over 22 years, do not consider themselves members of the same
population as the citizens of Sri Lanka. Indeed, they operate as a de facto
52
government in the territory they control, and insist on local autonomy.
Since 1983, the Tigers have waged a war for a separate homeland for the
country Tamil ethnic minority, which is concentrated in the north and the

51. For example, Pakistan today has a limited scope of domestic sovereignty due to the
inability of political authority to gamer widespread public support; North Vietnam has long
suffered from erosion of sovereignty due to low levels of administrative capacity; the same might
be said of the Congo after it achieved independence.
52. See Somini Sengupta, A Hawk Narrowly Wins Sri Lanka PresidentialElection, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2005, at A3.
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east. The conflict has caused more than sixty thousand deaths." As a
result, the ability of Sri Lanka leaders to exercise sovereign authority over
its borders, and to exercise domestic sovereignty has been put on the back
burner.
Many citizens of Taiwan have in recent years regarded themselves not
to be a community of people associated with the Chinese mainland, and
they are quite vocal in criticisms about the government of China. China,
for its part, is vigilant in preventing this from escalating into a full-scale
separatist movement, and at present the dissent is expressed through civil
and diplomatic discourse, and other nonconfrontational modes of
persuasion. The situation tends to threaten China's ability to influence
domestic policy in Taiwan, and there is the specter of losing a strategic
geographic stronghold should Taiwan eventually secede from China.
China, in order to remain vigilant, must allocate significant resources to
insure that the Taiwan situation remains contained. In addition, China has
had to devote resources to exercise control over the Xinjiang province,
where significant minority populations have long yearned for
independence.'
The Ethiopian government enjoyed widespread international esteem
when its new generation of leaders turned democratic. But Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi faced a crisis in the wake of parliamentary elections in May
2005, in which to everyone's surprise, opposition candidates actually
finished strongly in major urban areas. The ruling party hastily changed
parliamentary rules to prevent the opposition from having a voice in the
Parliament. Clashes broke out, there was widespread violence, soldiers
fired on demonstrators and arrested the top leadership of the main
opposition group.55 Charges of treason were filed against opposition
leaders, and journalists sympathetic to the opposition were detained. It is
speculated that Eritrea, which has had a longstanding border dispute with
Ethiopia, may take advantage of the domestic crisis to take aggressive
action at the border. Numerous foreign leaders have accused the ruling
party of assuming dictatorship powers, and the status of Ethiopia in the
world community may well suffer. All these elements converge to whittle
away at Ethiopia sovereignty-its ability to control its borders, its ability
to implement domestic policy, and the pressure from foreign states
invariably erodes its Westphalian sovereignty.
53. See Somini Sengupia, SriLankan Navy andRebels Clash, Threatening Cease-Fire, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at A6.
54. See Howard W. French, A Remote Boomtown Where Mainly Newcomers Benefit, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at A4.
55. See Marc Lacey, Ethiopia Capital, Once Promising, Finds Itself in Crisis,N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2005, at A6.
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In Guatemala, an epidemic of violence by street gangs has disrupted the
ability of the government to operate effectively. Gangs have taken to
imposing so-called war taxes on neighborhood merchants, bus drivers and
delivery crews, killing and kidnapping those who get in their way. 6 There
is a sense that corrupt police and private security guards are involved in a
secret campaign of state-sponsored "social cleansing," aimed at the young
and the poor.
Numerous states have a relatively carefree approach about control over
their borders, resulting in a limited ability to control cross-border flows,
which implies an erosion of interdependence sovereignty, as has occurred
with respect to the Mexican border of the United States. Other examples
of a long-standing "tradition" of a laidback approach to borders, with
sometimes precarious consequences, include Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Nigeria, Benin and much of sub-Saharan Africa.
Population shifts can impact a state sovereignty. While the state may
retain its statehood despite the fact that there has been a major exodus of
population due to war, famine or other exigency, there will invariably be
a shift in the way sovereign powers are exercised. The government will
need to deploy resources in combating the situation that gave rise to the
displacement in the first place. This will radically change its former
domestic policies, and may give rise to ceding some sovereignty to
international agencies that offer help.
For instance, Chad has struggled to absorb hundreds of thousands of
refugees who entered its borders to escape ethnic warfare in the Darfur
region of Sudan, where at least two hundred thousand people have been
killed and millions forced to leave their villages." To cite another
example, the entire population of New Orleans vacated that city in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina in September 2005. The substantial damage to
the city infrastructure required the federal government to allocate
substantial resources to meet the demands of the disaster. The financial
burden alone places enormous strains on the government budget, and
constrains the its ability to nurture other domestic projects.
Refugees who are displaced in a foreign state during an emergency
remain citizens of their homeland. There may be a profound sense of
disenfranchisement, compounded by the fact that citizens, during the
period of displacement, may lack the ability to exercise rights of
citizenship (e.g., to vote, to petition their government, etc.). This can be
exacerbated if leadership back home starts to exercise emergency powers
that bypass normal government procedures.
56. See Ginger Thompson, Guatemala Bleeds in Vise Of Gangs and Vengeance, N.Y. TIMES,

Jan. 1, 2006, at 4.
57. See Polgreen, supra note 49.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss3/5

28

Cohan: Sovereignty in a Postsovereign World

SOVEREIGNTY IN A POSTSOVEREIGN WORLD

A displaced population, in their encampment, are not entitled to claim
"sovereign status" as a nation in exile or something of that sort. They do
not possess the features of statehood.58 Perhaps they constitute a stable
population, but the population is temporarily displaced from the territory
with which it identifies and calls its homeland. They eventually might
establish permanent communities, push for autonomy, and ultimately they
might negotiate with the host state for independence, much as the Kurds
in Northern Iraq have sought to do since their migration into northern Iraq.
But a change in the identity of a population, due to immigration or
other processes of social evolution, does not imply a change in sovereign
status of the state. For example, the United States originally had a nearly
uniform population of colonists from England, but as the years passed the
nation became one of immigrants from many other countries. Today, a
significant portion of the population consists of Asian, Muslim, Mexican,
and African-Americans, with only a minority of the population being
Anglo-Saxon. These changes in the makeup of the population have had no
bearing on America sovereign powers.
A state may be strong in one type of sovereignty but weak in another
aspect, or a state may possess some but not all types of sovereignty.
The various kinds of sovereignty do not necessarily covary. A state
can have one but not the other. The exercise of one kind of
sovereignty-for instance, international legal sovereignty-can
undermine another kind of sovereignty, such as Westphalian
sovereignty, if the rulers of a state enter into an agreement that
recognizes external authority structures, as has been the case for the
members of the European Union. A state such as Taiwan can have
Westphalian sovereignty, but not international legal sovereignty. A
state can have international legal sovereignty, be recognized by other
states, but have only the most limited domestic sovereignty either in
the sense of an established structure of authority or the ability of its
rulers to exercise control over what is going on within their own
territory. In the 1990s some failed states in Africa, such as Somalia,
served as unfortunate examples. A state can have international legal,
Westphalian, and established domestic authority structures and still
have very limited ability to regulate cross-border flows and their
consequent domestic impacts, a situation that many contemporary
observers conceive of as a result of globalization.59
58. Similarly, being a member of a religious society, or of a terrorist cell or some subnational

group such as a tribe or clan, does not suggest that the group possesses sovereignty.
59. KRASNER, supra note 14, at 4.
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There are occasional situations where sovereignty completely
collapses. When central authority breaks down there may be a period of
anarchy in which warring factions engage in an unending power struggle.
In such settings, any semblance of sovereignty on the part of the state is in
limbo. The very apparatus of government is no longer viable, the state
itself may undergo a period in which it is regarded as a failed state, as
suggested in the above passage, with such examples as Somalia, Sierra
Leone, and Congo.
VII. REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY: THE MODERN
LIMITATIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY

Today we are witnessing a phenomenal change in how sovereignty
manifests itself in the world. The traditional Westphalian notion of

sovereignty by which a state had absolute territorial control and the right
to exercise domestic powers free from external constraints has, in large
part, become unrecognizable. This underscores the fact that sovereignty is
a malleable power: "[S]overeignty as a principle of international law has
never been absolute, but relative in the sense that the sovereignty of one
state found its legal limits in the sovereignty of the other states."' 0
At times rulers adhere to conventional norms or rules because it
provides them with resources and support (both material and
ideational). At other times, rulers have violated the norms, and for
the same reasons. If rulers want to stay in power and to promote the
security, material, and ideational interests of their constituents,
following the conventional practices of Westphalian and
legal sovereignty might or might not be an optimal
international
61
policy.
Whereas in an earlier day, and still to some extent today, the breakdown
of sovereignty involved disputes over borders, geography, demographics,
ideologies, or religious conflicts-today I believe there are three
categories that are principally responsible for the reshaping of sovereignty,
and we will consider each one separately: Horizontal Ceding of
Sovereignty, Vertical or External Imposition of Norms, and Globalization.
60. Jost Delbruck, Prospectsfora World (Internal)Law? LegalDevelopments in a Changing
International System, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401,427 (2002).
61. KRASNER, supra note 14, at 24.
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A. HorizontalCeding of Sovereignty
Sovereignty will be ceded, first of all, in a horizontal sense. This we
often see is the case when the mode of government moves away from
autocracy and closer to democracy, with concomitant power-sharing
among representatives of the people. We see this, in more recent times,
when government decision-making power is ceded pursuant to powersharing arrangements with international organizations, coalitions or
treaties to which the state becomes a party.
1. Democratic Form of Governance
In any situation where a state emerges from an absolute monarchy,
dictatorship or other form of autocracy, and moves towards a
representative form of government, the locus of sovereignty shifts away
from the "head of state" and is dispersed among branches of government.
Through democratic processes, representatives are elected with the
authority to exercise specified powers. A democracy, with the overriding
idea of power retained by the people, and with each branch of government
being one of limited powers, allocates sovereign powers among various
actors, with well-delineated limitations. The Congress can pass any laws
it wants, but only those that pass constitutional muster as ultimately
determined by the judicial branch. The President is elected by the voters,
and is subject to term limits, impeachment, and the checks and balances
of the legislative and judicial branches of government. The President
cannot do many things that he might want to do-dissolve the Congress,
for instance. The U.S. Constitution ensures that certain specified rights are
retained by the people and cannot be abridged. Hence, authoritarian
governments are wary of any push for democratic-style reform, as this
could encroach on the monopoly of sovereign powers vested with the
existing power base.
In a democracy, a significant amount of sovereign power is ceded to
the judicial branch of government. Marbury v. Madison made it clear that
the United States is a nation of popular sovereignty. In order that the
sovereign will of the people "may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the
constitution is written., 62 The popular sovereign is, in the words of
Marbury,"permanent," 3and the people have "superior" authority." When

the U.S. Supreme Court speaks, it purports to speak on behalf of the
62. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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sovereign people, its pronouncement is the supreme law of the land, and
it is unimaginable that any other political institution would defy it.
The courts are vested with a set of judicial duties that include
regulating the behavior of the government itself-e.g., deciding if a law
or act of the government violates the Constitution, whether government
officials have violated the rights of citizens in one way or another, whether
an accused has been accorded due process with respect to criminal
proceedings, whether an act of eminent domain is within the powers of the
government, and so on. Of course, the legislative branch can, to an extent,
curtail the scope of powers vested with the judiciary by legislative act.
In states that have a closed political system, or in any system where
corruption is allowed to permeate the judicial branch, there is little ceding
of power to the judiciary. In China, for example, the government, not the
court system, is the final arbiter of law.6" Many judges must answer to
government officials, and political pressure is common. The court system
has a subservient status within the Chinese bureaucracy. Private trial
committees often dictate rulings.
2. The Rise of International Organizations
Just as corporations and criminals have established global networks
through which they operate, with a de-emphasis on centralized command
authority, so have states formed interconnected institutions of cooperation.
Cooperation is a pragmatic way for sovereign states to attain mutual
benefits of an economic, military, cultural, or political nature. Beyond
cooperation, a state can also decide to cede some of its sovereignty by
joining a coalition of states in which certain economic, political or other
issues get decided by external auspices. "[I]f sovereignty now expresses
a reanimated sense of autonomy, it does so in the guise of a perfectly
rational paradox: its existence also is defined by its capacity to be given
away."66

Horizontal arrangements got started in earnest following World War II,
with inter-governmental organizations such as the United Nations, and
other international organizations such as the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), the International Monetary Fund, the European Human Rights
Convention and the European Union, among others. 6' These institutions
65. See Jim Yardley, A Judge Tests China Courts, Making History, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
2005, at Al.
66. Brian F. Havel, The Constitution in an Era of Supranational Adjudication, 78 N.C. L.
REv. 257, 328 (2000).

67. The Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court has expanded or restricted
sovereignty, depending on one point ofview. It has restricted sovereignty by conferring universal
jurisdiction over human rights abuses and war crimes to the ICC. The ICC requires states to
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of cooperation sought to harmonize both economic and non-economic
agendas.
These post-War developments worked to modify domestic sovereignty
with the basic tenets of global harmonization and interdependence. The
international system has now become a "tightly woven fabric of
international agreements, organizations and institutions that shape [states']
relations with one another and penetrate deeply into their internal
economics and politics."' 8 Another commentator observes:
[W]here the defining features of the international system are
connection rather than separation, interaction rather than isolation,
and institutions rather than free space, sovereignty as autonomy
makes no sense. The new sovereignty is status, membership,
"connection to the rest of the world and the political ability to be an
actor within it." However paradoxical it sounds, the measure of a
state capacity to act as an independent unit within the international
system-the condition that "sovereignty" purports both to grant and
describe--depends
on the breadth and depth of its links to other
69
states.
Just by joining the United Nations, a state constrains its own sovereignty.
On the one hand, Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter seems to affirm
Westphalian sovereignty by stating: "nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State."" ° On the
other hand, it has been advanced that "the compact among Member States
to the U.N. Charter to respect the sovereignty of other nations unless
regional or international peace and security is threatened is not absolute,
but negotiable."' Membership in the United Nations and in other
international organizations "means that the participating state accepts the
right of its fellow members to intervene in its domestic affairs if it has
failed in its most fundamental obligations to protect its own citizens-a
implement legislation that addresses human rights abuses. Some think that the ICC has expanded
sovereignty by pooling, that is, by enlarging domestic sovereignty as part of support of the
international system. and as extending the concern for breaches of human rights to the actions and
relations of citizens, wherever they may be. Others think that state sovereignty is eroded by a
supranational criminal court that wields universal jurisdiction to try global crimes.
68. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 26 (1995).

69. Slaughter, supra note 17, at 286 (quoting CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 68, at 26).
70. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
71. Stacy, supra note 23, at 2035.
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kind of conditional social contract."72 By joining the United Nations, a
state deprives itself of the right to initiate or wage a just war at its
sovereign discretion, and as a practical matter the binding force of Security
Council resolutions and the decisive role of the permanent veto-carrying
members, have a constraining force on the sovereignty of states (as well
as on the notion of sovereign equality).
The European Union has gained legal supremacy over Member States
by disclaiming anything like sovereignty for itself, yet it has numerous
features of sovereignty: a territory, legal recognition, control, national
authority, extranational authority, and supranational authority (with the
representatives of the union conducting some international negotiations),
and a mixture of territorial and extraterritorial control. The states that are
members of the EU, in contrast, lack supranational or extranational
authority.
Member States do not, for instance, transfer their sovereignty to a
federal European state. They "pool" their sovereignty in a way such that
each state is still sovereign, but not in the traditional understanding of
sovereignty. Member States retain their own armies and their own
diplomatic envoys and their own seats at the United Nations. The
European Union has no army of its own, no police of its own, no voting
representation at the United Nations. EU members pledge to pursue a
"common foreign and security policy" even though not all members are
actually pledged to provide forces to assist other members.73 Some
Member States, for instance, are in NATO and others are pledged to
neutrality. The Iraq War split the European Union, with some members
sending troops to assist the American-led coalition, and others leading the
international opposition to it.
The European Union has been accorded international legal sovereignty,
and it has been a participant in many international conferences including
the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Seas (and is a signator
to the U.N. Law of the Seas Convention), and the Conference on
Cooperation and Security in Europe. It has been a signatory to various
international accords that fall within its purview, various international
commodity agreements, the Helsinki Final Act, and several environmental
conventions. It is a full member of the Food and Agriculture Organization,
although it generally has observer, nonvoting status in most U.N. agencies.
The horizontal ceding of power to the European Union vests it with an
unconventional sort of sovereignty. The structure of the European Union
and how the entity should be categorized are not entirely clear, and not yet
72. Slaughter, supra note 17, at 286.

73. Treaty ofAmsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts (Oct. 2, 1997), art. 1, 3, 1997 OJ (C340).
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settled. The EU is neither a state, a commonwealth, a dominion, a
confederation of states or a federation of states, although it may well
evolve into a conventional federal state.
B. Vertical or ExternalImposition of Norms
The imposition of external norms on states appears, today, focused on
cases where sovereignty will be ceded in a vertical sense when the
international community imposes standards of good governance and
human rights norms on states. Interference with domestic states engage in
torture, murder, ethnic cleansing, or systematically discriminate against
their own citizens. A U.N. Declaration, or Resolution of the Security
Council, can have a "top down" kind of impact on non-consenting states.
Standards "from above" are sometimes imposed by non-state entities such
as NGOs, regional or sub-regional actors, and international agencies.
1. Inherent Vertical Constraints
In various ways, the scope of sovereignty today is determined in a "topdown," or vertical fashion, with international norms being imposed from
without. External norms are imposed upon states by diplomatic and public
persuasion, coercion, shaming, economic sanctions, isolation, and in more
egregious cases, by humanitarian intervention. In addition to norms being
imposed by state actors against other states, in recent years NGOs have
played an important role in vertically influencing the behavior of states.
Once a state is constituted, it automatically acquires external
obligations, namely those based on customary international law. Whether
or not it agrees with the norms, and regardless of the state form of
governance, it is held obligated to obey them, and, thus, sovereign powers
are inherently subject to formal vertical constraints. The U.S. Supreme
Court has said that a rule of customary international law is often presumed
to be a "universal law of society."74 Vattel, a classic commentator in
international law, said that the "customary law of nations" consists of
"certain maxims and customs consecrated by long use, and observed by
nations in their mutual intercourse with each other as a kind of law.""
Customary international law may sometimes be more widely applicable to
states than rules arising from international agreements. That is, because so
much is left unregulated by treaty, customary international law may
sometimes have more widespread application than treaty law. Customary
international law has evolved significantly so that actions that would have
74. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheaton) 153, 161 (1820).
75. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPUED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, at xv (1797).
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been permissible in the past are now universally condemned. For example,
it is clearly part of customary international law that torture is prohibited,
and any state that violates this norm violates customary international law."6
A potent kind of vertical constraint has been evidenced by media and
other scrutiny addressed to numerous types of human rights violations.
Initially, the Bush Administration referred to the significant international
scrutiny with respect to the terrorist detention camp at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba as flawed and superficial." Subsequently, human rights and civil
liberties organizations, politicians, and newspapers brought further
pressure upon the Bush Administration to close the detention center.78
President Bush himself said at a summit of the European Union, "I'd like
' Thus, this kind of international
to end Guantanamo."79
criticism, in itself,
from sources such as the media, other political branches of government,
or NGOs--can impose significant constraints on a state's sovereignty.
Sometimes regional organizations to which states cede sovereignty in
a horizontal sense, not only conduct summit meetings to discuss issues of
mutual concern, but may operate in a dynamic way to issue vertical-style
demands. For example, the Association of South East Asian Nations
recently met and issued a statement to the press demanding tangible action,
including the release of detainees, in Myanmar.8 °
2. Human Rights Norms
Today, the sovereign must answer not only to its own citizens for its
failings, but also directly to the international community. Increasingly,
admission into the international community is deeply influenced by the
need for a state to show evidence of "good" sovereignty, particularly with
respect to human rights standards.
Thus, states may not reject certain norms based on a claim of absolute
or exclusive "sovereignty." Sovereignty today is increasingly defined by
the language of a human rights culture. If a population is helpless to
defend itself against tyranny, it is of little comfort that a state otherwise is
in control of its territory, and that its government is able "to provide
security, economic stability and a measure of prosperity, clean air and
water," and so on.8
76. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
77. See Tim Golden, US. Should Close Prison in Cuba, U.N. Panel Says, N.Y. TIMES, May
20, 2006, at Al.
78. Drake Bennett, The Road From Guantanamo, BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, 2006, at Dl.
79. See id.
80. See Seth Mydans, As an Asian Century Is Planned, US. Power Stays in the Shadows,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 2005, at AI2.
81. See Slaughter, supra note 17, at 284.
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"Sovereignty" will no longer excuse the violation of human rights
norms against slavery, torture, genocide, arbitrary confiscation of property
and other deontological constraints. The panoply of human rights has
extended to such concerns as better treatment by the police, a cleaner
environment, respect of the claims of indigenous populations, addressing
the special needs of the disabled, health care, education, and of course
protection of exploitation of the weak or vulnerable.
The most fundamental point about human rights law is that it
establishes a set of rules for all states and all people. It thus seeks
to increase world unity and to counteract national separateness (but
not necessarily national distinctions). In this sense, the international
law of human rights is revolutionary because it contradicts the
notion of national sovereignty-that is, that a state can do as it
pleases in its own jurisdiction. 2
Thus,
What seems to be emerging is a notion that a sovereign claim to
impermeable borders will not hold up when the sovereign behaves
irresponsibly towards its citizens. In the era of international human
rights, it seems the international community has become a party to
the social contract between citizens and their government.8 3
The vertical impact of human rights norms on sovereignty is supported by
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS). This organization was established by a group of major
foundations, headed by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans
and Special Adviser to the U.N. Secretary General Mohamed Sahnoun.
The ICISS issued an influential report in December 2001, entitled "The
Responsibility to Protect," which essentially called for updating the U.N.
Charter to incorporate a new understanding of sovereignty. 8 The report
82. DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HuMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD POLITICS 4 (1983).
83. Stacy, supra note 23, at 2034.
84. ICISS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, REPORT OFTHE INT'L COMM. ON INTERVENTION

AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001). The ICISS began from the premise that "[i]n key respects...
the mandates and capacity of international institutions have not kept pace with international needs
or modem expectations." Id. 1.11. The ICISS argued that the intense debate over military
protection for humanitarian purposes flowed from a critical gap between the immense and
unavoidable reality of mass human suffering and the existing rules and mechanisms for managing
world order. At the same time, it noted a widening gap between the rules and the principles of the
U.N. Charter regarding noninterference in the domestic affairs of Member States and actual state
practice as it has evolved since 1945. Id. 1.33. It frames the responsibility to protect as an merging
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described a shift "'from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as
responsibilityin both internalfunctionsand externalduties."8 5 This marks
a shift in the concept of sovereignty, which has previously been
characterized as the right of a state to exercise supreme power over its
territory and citizens, free from outside interference.
The ICISS Report concluded that "[w]here a population is suffering
serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state
failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it,
the principle
of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility
86
protect.
to
It is a delicate balance. On the one hand, a state has the responsibility
to protect the dignity and basic human rights of its own people; and the
international community has the responsibility to respect the sovereignty
of other states. Yet, under the ICISS view, there is an overriding
responsibility for states to insure that basic human rights are not abridged
by other states. 7
Another area of human rights abuse involves the response by states to
subnational groups seeking autonomy. A not uncommon pattern has been
that when subnational groups are seeking self-determination, the state
starts engaging in human rights abuses against them. The sub-state groups
in turn escalate their claim for heightened autonomy or secession, and
justify the use of force against the national army or police force to defend
their own people. States may no longer shield themselves from
international scrutiny of human rights abuses committed as part of their
attempts to stifle self-determination movements.8 8
3. Nongovernment Organizations (NGOs)
Another area in which there is a vertical impact on sovereignty
involves the influence of international nongovernment organizations
(NGOs) such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and the World
Wildlife Fund. In addition to NGOs, "ethnic constituencies often

principle of customary international law-not yet existing as law but already supported both by
state practice and a wide variety of legal sources. Id. 1 2.24-2.27.
85. The Responsibility to Protect,Report of the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty, ch. 2.14 (2001), available at http://www.idrc.ca/books/ev_9436_
201_1_DO TOPIC.html.
86. ICISS, supranote 84, at xi.
87. Id. 2.29.
88. Examples of this include the Iraqi Anfal campaigns against the Kurds, the violation of
Kurdish human rights in Turkey, the Russian campaign in Chechnya, the targeting of Christians in
southern Sudan, and Indonesia brutal occupation of East Timor.
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composed of emigrants from a particular suffering state also work
systematically to raise the salience of any particular human rights crisis."'8 9
NGOs are comparable to domestic lobbyists and pressure groups that
seek to assert policy preferences on lawmakers. Both NGOs and lobbyists
rely on a mixture of moral and scientific arguments, access to
relevant data, and the instrumental mobilization of popular
pressure, including demonstrations and letter-writing campaigns.
Both tend to make exaggerated claims about the breadth or depth of
popular support for their goals. Both provide technical expertise and
informal policy advice to governments."
NGOs began to assert their voice to influence the behavior on states during
the mid- to late-twentieth century. As a result, individual states are
increasingly accustomed (however reluctantly) to the presence of NGOs
in a variety of monitoring activities pertaining to compliance with
international norms. Over the years, NGOs have been successful in
influencing governments to address issues such as environmental
protection, anti-personnel landmines, human trafficking, and violence
against women, among many other issues. 9
NGOs often have reputations for credibility and careful fact-checking,
so that governments and media pay attention when the organizations
publicize a state non-compliance with its duties under international law.92
NGOs employ various tactics to target the behaviors and policies of states,
including:
(1) information politics, or the ability to quickly and credibly
generate politically usable information and move it to where it will
have the most impact; (2) symbolic politics, or the ability to call
upon symbols, actions, or stories that make sense of a situation for
an audience that is frequently far away; (3) leveragepolitics,or the
ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where
weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence; and
(4) accountabilitypolitics, or the effort to hold powerful actors to
their previously stated policies or principles.93
89. Slaughter, supranote 17, at 285.
90. See Daniel C. Thomas, InternationalNGOs, State Sovereignty, andDemocratic Values,
2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 389, 392 (2001).
91. See id. at 391.
92. See id. at 390.
93. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SuuNK, AcTIVIsTs BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 15 (1998).
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Often the action of NGOs will consist of reports accusing officials of
engaging in human rights violations and demanding accountability.94
Some states, such as Russia, are seeking to avert the influence ofNGOs
by restricting foreign support for political activity in the country. A recent
proposal in the Russian Parliament would require NGOs to register with
the Ministry of Justice, impose restrictions on their ability to accept
donations or hire foreigners, and prohibit foreign organizations from
opening branches in Russia."' The sentiment in the Parliament is that
foreign organizations often undermine Russia domestic sovereignty.
China, as well, has imposed a broad clampdown in NGO-activity.96
4. Coercion Through Diplomacy, Shaming, and Isolating
A kind of public relations phenomenon has permeated states, which are
ever more conscious of their "persona," that is, how their "message" is
being played before an international audience. International scrutiny can
have a coercive, shaming impact that can change how a state behaves
internally. States do not want to be "outcasts," and they are mindful of the
sanctions that could occur if international norms are violated.
The acts of a corrupt government of a state can risk alliances with
stable nations and put its leaders into an awkward bind if they wish to
garner continued economic and political support from other states. If a
state experiences the severing of diplomatic ties and a falling out of good
graces on an international scale this can have serious psychological and
economic ramifications.
A state "bad behavior" does not necessarily imply the violation of
international law. China's tight control over the Internet and media may
be offensive to the West, but state control of the media does not violate
international law. Still, with state behavior that is "benign," in that it is
offensive but legal, other states may seek to coerce the offending state into
changing its policies by such tactics as international shaming, protest, and
ostracism.
International scrutiny in its various manifestations may or may not be
causally effective in coercing weaker states to change their domestic
institutional structures. For example, with Egypt, criticism of longstanding
election rigging led the governing party to conclude that it can maintain
94. See, e.g., Marc Lacey, Rights Group Ties Sudan Chief to Darfur Crimes, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2005, at AS.
95. See Steven Lee Myers, Russia Pushing Measure to Curb Private Groups, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2005, at A1; see also WorldBriefing, Russia: Tightening Reins on Private Groups, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at A10.
96. See Jim Yardley, Seeking a Public Voice on China's "Angry River," N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
26, 2005, at Al.
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power and win greater credibility by not resorting to the heavy-handed
tactics of the past, but by opening the political process to allow for a viable
political opposition.97
North Korea long conducted its government in an oppressive, highlycontrolled manner, limiting the rights of its citizens, carrying on
disreputable economic policies that eroded the qualify of life of its
peoples, but the international community let this be. Once the leaders of
that country decided to experiment in developing nuclear weapon
capability, the tide changed. There was a growing consensus that North
Korea must not be permitted to develop nuclear capability, that its
sovereignty must be compromised so that the traditional balance of power
might be maintained. For the most part, North Korea, as well as Iran, have
resisted international efforts to curtail their nuclear programs, and only
time will tell whether diplomatic efforts or international "shaming" will
have an effect.
American pressure has induced officials in Afghanistan to enlarge
efforts to eradicate poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. However, while
50,000 farmers decided to not plant their fields with opium poppy, the
reality remains that many provincial governors and police profit from the
trade, and about 25 percent of the members of Parliament are said to be
involved with the production and trafficking of opium.9" And, in Bolivia,
after years of American efforts to eliminate coca as part of its fight against
the illegal drug trade, a newly elected president, Evo Morales, a former
coca farmer, is fiercely in favor of legalizing coca production. 9
Another way of interfering with sovereignty of a state is by the "bully
pulpit" of international leaders. A public "dressing down" by world
leadership can help bring attention to the ongoing controversy surrounding
a state's undesirable domestic policies. For example, in November 2005,
Secretary General Kofi Annan publicly announced he was dropping plans
to visit Tehran in response to a speech given by Iran President, Mahmoud
Ahmandinejad, who said that Israel "must be wiped off the map."1 °° This
call for the destruction of Israel was deemed a threat to the territorial
integrity of Israel, and was unanimously condemned by a Security Council
97. See Michael Slackman, Bad Habits Linger at the Polls in Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2005, at A4.
98. See Warren Hoge, UN. Reports Some Reduction In Afghanistan Opium Output, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2005, at A13.
99. See Juan Forero, Bolivia Elects A President Who Supports Coca Farming, N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 19, 2005, at A8.
100. See Warren Hoge, Annan, Citing Talk on Israel, Drops Iran Trip, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2005, at A7.
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resolution.' On the other hand, some analysts believe that by increasing
the world hostility, Mr. Ahmandinejad expects to bolster the support from
within that will help strengthen his domestic sovereign powers, which is
particularly needed at a time of widespread unemployment and the
collapse of rural life in Iran. 102
Many Iraquis were proud of Saddam Hussein invasion of Kuwait in
1990-9 1, thinking that it was long overdue and that part of Kuwait must be
ceded to Iraq. But the international community overwhelmingly
condemned the invasion and, as a consequence, we saw that the
sovereignty of Iraq was marginalized, isolated and restricted. The
international condemnation was quickly followed by military attacks
against Iraq. While the government of Saddam Hussein remained in place,
the imposition of "no-fly" zones, the "oil-for-food" program, and other
policies restricted Iraq's Westphalian and domestic sovereignty, and,
hence, Saddam Hussein had lost much of his ability to control his nation's
political destiny.
There is a fine line between one state's criticizing another state's
policies or its violations of international law, and making insulting or
derogatory remarks about the character or ideology of another state's
leadership. The utterances by high officials of inflammatory, threatening
or denigrating comments directed at the rulers of other states is considered
an improper interference in the internal affairs of the other state.'0 3 "It has
been generally accepted that official utterances of this character constitute
illegal intervention and may be protested against if they are derogatory to
the sovereign, the ambassador, or the state, or tend to stir up domestic
revolt or international aggression."" °4 That is, it is improper for a sovereign
to criticize other states on the grounds of moral character or ideology, or
to make utterances that would tend to incite revolt or sabotage within the
other state. "To do so would deny the respect which states owe to one
another, would tend to undermine the internal authority of other states, and
would constitute intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of another
state."'0° Yet it is permissible to criticize other states for pursuing injurious
101. See id. Iran President was later reported to have said in a speech that the Nazi killings of
six million European Jews during World War II was a myth and never occurred. See Associated
Press, IranPresidentClarifies His Stand On Holocaust:It a European Myth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,

2005, at AS.
102. See Nazila Fathi & Michael Slackman, Iranian Oratory Reflects Devotion to 9
Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at A3.
103. See Quincy Wright, InternationalLaw and Ideologies, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 616, 622

(1954).
104. Id. at624.
105. Id.
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policies or neglecting duties under international law. Obviously, this is a
fine line.
Diplomatic protocol, however, does not apply to NGOs, which have led
the way in overturning the long-standing diplomatic taboo that prevented
states from directly criticizing the leadership behaviors of other states.
5. Sanctions
Another kind of vertical intrusion into sovereignty points to the fact
that while, in principle, all states are equal, in fact power asymmetries
permit some states to exert a greater influence on world affairs than others.
Hegemony is the de facto leverage that more powerful states wield to
influence the economic and political policies (both domestic and
international) of other states. The threat or imposition of economic
sanctions by more powerful states can interfere with the policies of weaker
states and can cause rulers to change their institutional structures.
Between 1970 and 1990 the United States imposed economic sanctions
against more than a dozen countries with a view towards coercing changes
in human rights policies. From 1972 to 1979 the United Kingdom imposed
sanctions against Uganda to force out Idi Amin. Hamas, the radical Islamic
party that is widely viewed as a terrorist organization, won 76 out of 132
seats in recent Palestinian legislative elections, a result that is far from
desirable to Israel and her allies."° To express international ostracism of
Hamas leaders, aid packages to the Palestinian Authority have been
withheld. 0 "
International organizations also have been known to exert pressure by
way of sanctions. Recently, the Security Council threatened Eritrea with
economic sanctions unless it reversed its decision to bar U.N. helicopter
flights and end other restrictions on the U.N. peace-keeping mission
monitoring its border with Ethiopia, also warning Ethiopia of sanctions if
it used force to settle its frontier dispute. 18
Western donors announced they were withholding a $375 million
economic package to Ethiopia because of the government crackdown on
opposition supporters." The United Nations authorized collective
sanctions against South Africa from 1962 until 1994 for the purpose of
106. See Steven Erlanger, Hamas Routs RulingFaction, Casting Pall on Peace Process, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at Al.
107. See Steven ErlangerHamaslsFacingA Money Crisis; AidMayBe Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 2006, at Al.
108. See Warren Hoge, WorldBriefing, Africa: Eritrea: Threat of U.N. Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2005, at A13.
109. See World Briefing, Ethiopia: Donors to Withhold $375 Million, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 30,
2005, at A10.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

43

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 5

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Vol. 18

ending apartheid. The European Community used economic pressure
against Turkey in 1981-82 to encourage the restoration of democracy. The
World Bank suspended all loans to Chad, "including one that helped
finance a $4.2 billion oil pipeline," because the country "had broken an
agreement to largely dedicate its oil revenues to alleviating" extreme
poverty in its population."0 Chad President, Idriss Deby, said that his
country had a "sovereign right" to decide how to spend the oil money."'
Sanctions do not always produce the intended results. Russia had
sought to withhold gas from Ukraine pipeline system in an effort to exert
influence on Ukraine internal politics in connection with a parliamentary
election, but quickly reneged in response to sharp criticism across Europe,
including countries like Germany that are usually reliable allies."2 For
years the West has imposed economic sanctions against Myanmar
regarding human rights abuses, with the government responding not by
concessions, but by reigning in more power, wielding tighter control over
the state-controlled media, and conducting government business in a
shroud of secrecy." 3 And America's long-standing Cuban embargo has
failed to make inroads in achieving change in Castro regime, or in
pressuring Cuba to compensate U.S. citizens and businesses which lost
money and property in the Cuban nationalization program.
6. Humanitarian Intervention: The Breakdown of Order, Civil War,
Corruption, Harboring of Terrorists, or Other Factors
If a state crosses the line from benignly bad behavior to an outright
violation of international law, stronger measures may be used to coerce
change. If powerplay tactics, diplomacy, economic sanctions,
"containment," and other devices fail to move a state to cease violating
international law, state actors can be held accountable in ad hoc tribunals
or the International Criminal Court," 4 as occurred in the aftermath of
Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia.

110. See Celia W. Dugger, World BankSuspendsLoans to Chad Over Use of Oil MoneyN.Y.

TIMES, Jan. 7, 2006, at A5.
111. See id.
112. See Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Restores Most of Gas Cut to Ukraine Line, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 2006, at Al.
113. See Seth Mydans, Looking for the Burmese Junta? Sorry. It's Gone Into Hiding, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2005, at A4.

114. For example, in 1999 when rebels in Indonesia killed East Timorese by the hundreds,
U.N. Secretary General Annan issued a statement that senior Indonesian officials risked prosecution
for crimes against humanity if they did not consent to the deployment of an available multinational
force. See U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Statement (Sept. 10, 1999).
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Beyond that, a coalition of states may decide to override sovereignty
completely. The ICISS Report suggests that the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention is not merely permissive, but is an affirmative duty on the part
of other states. The Report recognizes both the responsibility of every state
to protect its citizens from human rights abuses and, failing that, the
responsibility of other states to provide protection. Under this view, the
duties of sovereigns are as important as the rights of sovereigns. This
concept of a duty to protect a population suffering harm at the behest of an
oppressive regime flies in the face of Westphalian sovereignty.
The idea is that not all states are sovereign from a behavioral
perspective. If a state abnegates its responsibility to its people in a way
that rises to human rights abuse-then the state in fact fails to exercise the
authority conferred by sovereignty, and other states are duty-bound to
intervene to carry out that function.
Humanitarian intervention has emerged in customary international law
to allow armed force to be used
as a last resort to avert overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe that
a government has shown it is unwilling or unable to prevent or is
actively promoting; it must be objectively clear that there is no
practicable alternative to the use of force to save lives; the use of
force should be proportionate to the humanitarian purpose and
likely to achieve its objectives; any use of force should be
collective. 15
It has become normative to interfere with state sovereignty if there is
systematic human rights abuse, ruthless political oppression, or anarchy
resulting from the complete disintegration of political authority." 6 The
Security Council has repeatedly found that the conditions prevailing within
states, from starvation in Somalia, to the coup d' tat in Mauritania in
August 2005, to political intimidation and massacre in East
Timor-involve a threat to international peace and security sufficient to
require collective armed intervention, not merely public condemnation in
harsh terms.
115. See Christine Gray, From Unity to Polarization: InternationalLaw and the Use ofForce
Against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 13 (2002).
116. Examples of anarchy include Afghanistan and Zaire. After the end of the Afghan-Soviet
War in 1989, political clans engaged in a struggle for power in Afghanistan, resulting in nearly
complete anarchy. See Carla Power, When Women are the Enemy: Afghanistan Taliban Fighters
Have Taken the War Between the Sexes to a New Extreme, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 1998, at 37. Zaire
(currently the Democratic Republic of Congo) arguably qualified as an anarchic state. See John
Darnton, Zaire Drifting into Anarchy asAuthorityDisintegrates,N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1994, at Al.
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Humanitarian intervention is of heightened importance given the
interconnectedness of the world community, coupled with the availability
of nuclear weapons. There is a kind of edginess in the world, so that "the
potential destabilization of the entire region, or a miasma of disease and
crime""' can pose a fundamental threat to other states.
In appropriate cases, the international community may find it to be a
duty to effect a regime-change in states that are subjected to humanitarian
crises, such as genocide or other crimes against humanity. On the other
hand, there is concern that powerful states may use humanitarian
intervention in an abusive way, or attempt to mold the doctrine to
accommodate shifting policies ofthe state. What if powerful states believe
that terrorist organizations can be contained only by restricting their
passage through third countries, rather than directly confronting the
terrorists themselves? History offers many examples of imperial powers
imposing their preferences on weaker "client" states. Scholars may
disagree as to whether the situation in Iraq was sufficient in terms of
human rights violations to justify the invasion and overthrow of Saddam
Hussein, but surely everyone would agree that if a modern-day Hitler took
control of a state, such a course would be supportable if not mandated.
Humanitarian intervention would seem to violate Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter, which states: "All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.""' On the other
hand, one might argue that humanitarian intervention does not violate
Article 2(4) because it is not a "use of force" against the "territorial
integrity" or "political independence" of any state.
Since the interventions in Somalia, Rwanda and Kosovo, the majority
of the international community has recognized the tragedy of ignoring
widespread, acute human suffering, and the legitimacy of coercive
humanitarian intervention particularly in the face of the U.N. Security
Council failure to act." 9 The United Nations failed to allow its troops
117. Slaughter, supra note 17, at 285.
118. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
119. See, e.g., T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of
Robust Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT'L& COMP. L. REv. 1 (2002), William Moorman, Humanitarian
Intervention and International Law in the Case of Kosovo, 36 NEW ENG. L. REv. 775 (2002);
Daniel H. Joyner, The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Paradigm, 13
EUR. J. INT'L L. 597 (2002); Celeste Poltak, Humanitarian Intervention: A Contemporary
Interpretation of the Charter ofthe United Nations, 60 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1 (2002); Michael
Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force andInternational Law After )) September, 51 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 401 (2002); Martti Koskenniemi, "The Lady Doth Protest too much " Kosovo, and the Turn
to Ethics in International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159 (2002); David Wippman, Kosovo and the
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stationed in Rwanda to intervene to stop the 1994 mass murder of 800,000
20 If a "coalition of the willing" had not intervened in defense
Tutsi people.m
of the Tutsi population but instead awaited Security Council authorization,
a great many more innocent lives would have been lost in the genocide

that was taking place.
Intervention can get started by a public relations campaign to put a
spotlight on the atrocities going on in the target state. States desirous of
engaging in humanitarian intervention may not be inclined to act within
the U.N. system but instead through regional coalitions, as was the case
with the intervention in Haiti in 1994 and the NATO coalition move to end
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999.2' This approach emphasizes the
legitimacy (not legality) of the action under both the spirit of the U.N.
Charter and basic notions of state responsibility to prevent human
atrocities.'22 In this regard, Thomas Franck has opined that
[w]hen the most basic of [civil and political rights] have been found
to have been violated-and only then-an enunciated international
consensus might now be ready to form around the proposition that
the use of some levels of force by states could be justified to secure
Limits oflnternationalLaw,25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 129(2001); NA TO Bombing ofKosovo Under
International Law: Symposium, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 95 (2001); A. Mark Weisburd,
InternationalLaw and the Problemof Evil, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 225 (2001); Abraham D.
Sofaer, InternationalLaw andKosovo, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2000); James D. Wilets, Lessons
from Kosovo: Towards a Multiple Track System of Human Rights Protection,6 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 645 (2000); Bartram S. Brown, HumanitarianIntervention at a Crossroads,41 wM. &
MARY L. REv. 1683 (2000); Inociencio F. Arias, HumanitarianIntervention: Couldthe Security
CouncilKill the UnitedStates?, 23 FoRDHAM INT'LL.J. 1005 (2000); George H. Aldrich, The Laws
of War on Land, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 42 (2000); Richard A. Falk Kosovo, World Order,and the
Future of InternationalLaw, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 847 (1999); W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo 's
Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 860 (1999); Thomas M. Franck, Lessons ofKosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 857 (1999); Ove Bring, After Kosovo: NATO Should Formulatea Doctrineon Humanitarian
Intervention?, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 61 (1999/2000); Christopher C. Joyner & Anthony Clark Arend,
Anticipatory HumanitarianIntervention: An Emerging Legal Norm?, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 27
(1999/2000); Gavin A. Symes, ForceWithoutLaw: SeekingaLegalJustificationforthe September
1996 US. Military Intervention in Iraq, 2 MICH. J. INT'L L. 581 (1998); John Currie, NATO
36 CANADIAN Y.B.
HumanitarianInterventionin Kosovo: Making orBreakinglnternationalLaw?,
INT'L L. 303 (1998); Michael L. Burton, Legalizing the Sublegal: A Proposalfor Codifying a
Doctrine of UnilaterialHumanitarianIntervention, 85 GEO. L.J. 417 (1996).
120. See Christopher Clarke Posteraro, Intervention in Iraq: Towards a Doctrine of
AnticipatoryCounter-Terrorism,Counter-ProliferationIntervention, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 153, 195
(2002).
121. It may be observed that "Secretary-General Kofi Annan gave his implicit blessing to the
NATO air campaign, citing it as an example of force that was necessary for the restoration of
peace." See id.at 195.
122. Id.
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democratic entitlements for peoples unable to secure them for
themselves.' 23
Humanitarian intervention is a clear intrusion into the offending state
sovereignty, for it not only seeks to impose top-down standards that may
abrogate a state domestic policies, but it also may entail military
occupation or even a regime change.
C. Erosion of Sovereignty Due to Globalization
Today there is a veritable panoply of treaties, regional agreements,
U.N. Declarations, and other protocols that globalization is pushing toward
a orderless world so that domestic actions in one state can have rippling
effects that impact other states. Populations no longer live in separate
cultural enclaves with limited communication and interaction among them.
Even in cultures that are relatively insulated from the rest of the world,
there is still a profound conception of the character of other cultures. In a
world of large-scale trade there is a premium placed upon states
maintaining transparency rather than territorial isolation and secrecy.
There is a growing sentiment that preserving and protecting the Earth
ecology requires interdependence and unity. Even the most powerful states
are helpless to protect their borders from incursion by way of surprise
attacks with weapons of mass destruction with long-range delivery
systems.
Both the horizontal and vertical constraints on sovereignty would not
have had much of a chance to develop had it not been for globalization.
Despite being an ambiguous and vague term, globalization is generally
understood to refer to the wide geographic influence of economic forces
owing to the sharply reduced costs and time required to transport goods,
the speed with which communication is spread across the globe, and other
technological advances. In the new global order, citizenship belongs not
to people, but to firms and markets, particularly the global financial
markets; furthermore it is located not in individuals, not in citizens, but in
global economic actors. 24
Globalization and the rise of international structures appear to have
developed neck and neck since World War II so that the horizontal ceding
123. ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE 192 (1993) (quoting Thomas Franck, "Secret Warfare: Policy Options for a Modem Legal
and Institutional Context," Paper presented to the Conference on Policy Alternatives to Deal with
Secret Warfare: International Law, U.S. Institute of Peace, Mar. 16-17, 1990, at 18). See also
Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992).
124. SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 38
(1996).
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of sovereignty and the advent of globalization go hand in hand. Without
globalization, the sacrifice of sovereignty for the sake of collaboration
would lack urgency. Globalization magnifies the impact of world
conditions in a way that invites states to cede some sovereignty to external
institutional structures in order to address issues of common concern.
Activities within a state can adversely affect external populations. The
growing mobility of people as a feature of globalization, facilitates the
spread of disease across state borders. Terrorism, atmospheric pollution,
the drug trade, and the spread of AIDS throughout the world, all but
compel states to generate alliances to combat these common concerns.
In addition, globalization seems to have a synergy with the vertical
constraints we discussed, in which various interests make demands for
responsible governance. For example, given the rapid spread of news on
the Internet, even in states that censor the media, domestic corruption can
no longer be shielded from international scrutiny, and states as well as
NGOs will apply vertical pressure to discourage the practices in question.
The sheer force of news and images, and the ubiquitous presence ofNGOs
in trouble spots, have facilitated greater international scrutiny of domestic
policies and has apparently led to a greater transparency of the workings
of government.
With globalization we see a diminution of interdependence
sovereignty, that is, the power of states to control the flow of goods,
people, information, pollutants, diseases and ideas across territorial
borders. This in turn produces a trickle-down effect that dilutes a state
domestic sovereignty in that "if a state cannot regulate what passes across
its borders, it will not be able to control what happens within them.'1' 25
Domestic environmental policy is greatly influenced by globalization,
because the safety and health of citizens of one state might be affected by
the environmental policy of a neighboring state.' 26 Since the "shrinking"
size of the planet magnifies the mutual vulnerabilities of the world, a state
may find it necessary for the stability of its sovereignty to curtail pollution,
contrary to its desire, so as to avoid adversely impacting the environment
of other states.
Globalization also places a higher obligation on the sovereign to insure
that due care will be taken in how the citizens of the state treat people
outside their borders. For instance, there is growing consensus that the use
of sweatshop labor abroad is inherently unjust and is not justified by the
KRASNER, supra note 14, at 13.
126. For example, Australia and New Zealand argued that French nuclear tests conducted in
French colonial possessions in Polynesia damaged their enviroment within their territory and hence
violated their sovereignty, especially with regard to the radioactive fall-out. See Nuclear Test (Aust.
v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 433; Nuclear Test (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 511 (Dec. 20).

125.
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consumer demand for low-cost clothing. Another example is the
heightened scrutiny on how American officials treat foreigners kept in
military detention facilities abroad, and in the interrogation techniques
deployed.
Information technology, a feature of globalization, has induced an
erosion of domestic sovereignty in authoritarian regimes. The spectacular
ease with which information is collected and disseminated across borders
has curtailed the ability of authoritarian states to control the flow of
communication in and out of the state, hence the kind of information their
citizens receive. Even in such authoritarian states as China, Iran and Saudi
Arabia, where the media are tightly controlled, citizens have sensed the
flavor of new freedoms through avenues such as the Internet and satellite
TV. "These days, one can be 'inside' American ideas about markets and
American dreams about beauty virtually anywhere in the world.' 27 If
Saudi Arabia wishes to ban sexually explicit material, such as that carried
in Playboy or Hustler, given satellite access to international cable and the
pervasive availability of pornography on the Internet, the state will not be
able to enforce its censorship laws within its borders, other than to ban the
importation and circulation of such material.
The globalization of information also seems to have an impact on how
citizens interact with their government. Protests and public upheaval in
Kyrgyzstan led to the overthrow of that country's long-serving ruler,
President Askar Akayev.12 The fall of the Berlin Wall is another example
of how public sentiment led to a major shift of policy. The graphic
depictions of brutality that the electronic media instantly transmit
worldwide increases public awareness and, particularly in democratic
countries, may induce constituents to put pressure on government leaders
to counteract such brutalities and tragedies.
In another way, the communication revolution has worked to enhance
interdependence sovereignty by giving the state a greater capacity to keep
tabs on those within its borders by deploying surveillance technologies.
Repressive regimes still manage to suppress political dissent. The secret
police, or mukhabarat, "is one of the most powerful and ubiquitous forces
in the Arab world," and across the region those seeking democratic reform
are impeded by the central role of each country's secret police force.' 29 In
Jordan, for example, "the mukhabarat eavesdrops with the help of
thousands of Jordanians on its payroll, similar to the informant networks
127. Stacy, supra note 23, at 2055.
128. See Ethan Wilensky-Lanford, Political Activism Begins To Take Hold in Kyrgyzstan,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 2005, at A13.
129. See Neil MacFarquhar, Heavy Hand of the Secret Police Slows Reform in Arab World,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 2005, at Al.
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in the Soviet block."' 3 ° Chinese officials are vigilant in controlling the
flow of information to its citizens, utilizing "a combination of oldfashioned authoritarian muscle and the latest Internet technologies."'' For
example, to suppress information about police violence against
demonstrations against the construction of a power plant, the government
imposed a news blackout in which all Chinese news organizations were
prohibited from reporting the incident.'32 The government rendered
Internet links to foreign news sources inoperative, disabled the country
leading search engine, known as Baidu, and blocked remarks posted by
numerous bloggers who discussed the incident on their Web sites.' 33 In
addition, Chinese officials are using records of cellphone calls and
tracking data to determine the34location of people under scrutiny, and to
close in on criminal suspects.1
The advance of information technology has impacted how the world
community has come together with regards to terrorism. There is more
horizontal cooperation, with sharing of intelligence, extraditing of terrorist
suspects, and solidarity among international financial regulators to help
identify and freeze terrorist organization assets. Terrorism, being a global
problem, has impacted domestic sovereignty, inducing states to amplify
homeland security, to reform intelligence agencies to better track enemy
activity and destroy terrorist networks, and to disrupt black market
operations of nuclear technology. The war on terror has strengthened
interdependence sovereignty, with heighten state interest in immigration
and regulating the inflows and outflows of cars, trucks, ships and planes
through borders.
Another aspect of the advance in communication and technology is that
there may be heightened, if unrealistic, expectations as to the
responsibilities owed by the state to its citizens. The failings of
government response to citizens impacted by Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf
region in September 2005, underscores that citizens have enlarged
expectations of what it means for the government to provide for the safety,
security and economic interests of citizens, notwithstanding the problems
of functional intersections between local, state and federal government.
Responsible governance is increasingly seen as getting the job done
despite vast bureaucracies or complex interactions between local, state and
130. See id.
131. See Howard W. French, Beijing Casts Net of Silence Over Protest, N.Y. TevIES, Dec. 14,
2005, at A3.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. Matt Richtel, Cellphone TrackingInvites Scrutiny ofthe Legalities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2005, at AI.
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federal government. The American Red Cross has also been the target of
complaints that the organization failed to have an adequate presence in the
flood plains most directly affected by the storm, failed to provide enough
3
blankets in shelters, and handed out debit cards that did not work.1 5
People also have heightened expectations of NGOs. For instance,
refugees who have fled war-tom Sudan for Egypt, hoping for a better life,
have been disappointed by their treatment in their host country. One U.N.
official stated: "people have to understand that we are a U.N. agency that
has limited capacity, limited financial and human resources, and in all
cases we are bound by the law and regulations. We-just don't act
haphazardly
13 6 in accordance with the desires and requests of the person in
concerl."

Another way that globalization affects domestic policies is the
influence of scholarly articles, laws and judicial decisions from all parts
of the world. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has, from time to time,
considered the law of foreign tribunals for the purpose of comparing and

informing American jurisprudence. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the
Supreme Court determined that the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause prohibits the execution of any offender who was under
the age of 16 at the time of the crime, holding that this is consistent with
views expressed by "other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage,
and by the leading members of the Western European Community."' 37 In
Roper v. Simmons, another case construing the Eighth Amendment in
connection with a juvenile offender, the Court said that it is appropriate to
refer "to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as
instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of
'cruel and unusual punishments. ,,138 The Court took into consideration the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the United States has
not ratified, as containing an express prohibition on capital punishment for
crimes committed by juveniles under 18.139 The Court observed that "only
seven countries other than the United States have executed juvenile
offenders since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and China. Since then each of these
countries has either abolished capital punishment for juveniles or made
135. See Craig S. Stephanie Strom, PresidentofRed CrossResigns;BoardWoes, Not Katrina,
Citec, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, at Al.

136. Michael Slackman, FleeingSudan, Only to Languish in an EgyptianLimbo, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 2005, at A3 (quoting Ahmad Mohsen, assistant protection officer at the U.N. refugee
agency office in Cairo).
137. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988).
138. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
139. Id. at 576 (citing U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37, Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1468-70, entered intoforce Sept. 2, 1990).
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public disavowal of the practice."'" The Court said: "The opinion of the
world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions." '' In a
dissent, Justice O'Connor nonetheless acknowledged that "[o]ver the
course of nearly half a century, the Court has consistently referred to
foreign and international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving
standards of decency."' 42
A corollary to this is that American jurisprudence, in many ways, has
come to influence foreign law. 43 America adversarial procedures, costly
legal contestation, and frequent judicial intervention in matters of all
kinds, contrasts with the "informal, cooperative, and opaque system of
other advanced democracies."'" The American legal style seems to be
spreading around the world, perhaps fueled by the globalization of U.S.
law firms, and the international influence of American legal education.
When American law firms enter foreign markets,'they bring with
them American legal practices and forms of organization. Their
experience with adversarial legalism and their expertise in
megalawyering techniques, including multijurisdictional litigation,
lobbying, and the drafting of detailed contracts suited to liberalized
markets, give145them a number of advantages vis-a-vis their foreign
competitors.
"Some observers would applaud such Americanization as enhancing
transparency, accountability, and legal certainty. Others, however, would
view such a shift as the regrettable spread of an 'American Disease' of
excess lawyers and litigation."'"
The following passage suggests that the impact of globalization on
sovereignty has been overblown:
There is no evidence that globalization has systematically
undermined state control or led to the homogenization of policies
and structures. In fact, globalization and state activity have moved
in tandem. The level of government spending for the major
140. Id.
141. Id. at 578.

142. Id. at 504 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
143. See generallyR. Daniel Kelemen& Eric C. Sibbitt, The Globalization ofAmerican Law,

58 INT'L ORG. 101 (2004).
144. Id.at 104.
145. Id.at 111.
146. Id.at 105.
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countries has, on average, increased substantially since 1950 along
with increased trade and capital flows. Government policy has not
been hamstrung by the openness of international capital markets;
there has been no empirical relationship, for instance, between
government spending and capital flows. Levels of investment have
not been inversely correlated with corporate tax rates. Corporate
investment decisions depend on many factors, including the quality
of infrastructure-education,
telecommunications,
transportation-provided by state funds. The organization of firms
has varied across countries with regard to financing, governance
structures, and suppliers. Social welfare policies and tax policies are
not the same across the advanced industrialized states, the entities
most affected by globalization.' 47
Of course, in some ways the world is much the same despite the changes
in technology. We still see "the resort to war and violence both
international and civil, the incidence of famine, poverty, inequality, and
discrimination; to mention only a few of the factors which are as old as
48
civilization itself.... ,,
VIII. CONCLUSION

Despite difficulty of understanding the term, sovereignty remains a
central concept in international law. There is very little doubt that
sovereignty has never been, and cannot be "absolute," for one state's
assertion of unlimited sovereignty would invariably infringe on the
sovereignty of another state. Many firmly believe that "[t]he international
community has repeatedly recognized sovereignty as the most sacred and
fundamental right that a nation can possess."'4 9 Even so, the traditional
Westphalian notion of sovereignty by which a state had unrestrained
territorial control and the right to exercise certain powers over its
population without external interference has been so whittled away as to
be unrecognizable. As we have observed, sovereignty today is, to some
degree, the measurement of care by government for its citizens, as
informed by the international community.
Apart from that, important decision-making powers are restricted and
hemmed in by treaties, by customary international law, and by the sheer
147.

KRASNER, supra note 14, at 223.
148. Jennings, supra note 24, at 24.
149. Joshua B. Bevitz, Flawed Foreign Policy: Hypocritical U.S. Attitudes Toward
International Criminal Forums, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 931, 951 (2002).
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interdependence of states, economically, environmentally and due to
collective concerns about security. This horizontal and vertical ceding of
sovereignty seriously diminishes the capacities of states to exercise their
sovereign powers, but there is the advantage of cooperation, collaboration,
and the delegation of functions that some sovereigns would rather not have
to face. In addition, the5 0 way a state treats its citizens is of increasing
concern to other states.1
Sovereignty, it seems, is becoming conditional upon the ruler
discharging responsibilities of care towards the citizen. Moreover, the
international community now vies with citizens to be judges of sovereign
care. The social contract between the ruler and the ruled does not hold up
if the sovereign fails to treat citizens within the bounds of human
decency-an assessment that becomes
a tripartite negotiation between
5
sovereign, citizens, and the world. '
We have seen numerous examples of vertical constraints imposed by
states against other states, byNGOs, and by the sheer force of international
public scrutiny in an era of instant communication. We see an increasing
willingness of states to intervene by force of arms to defend human
rights. 5 2 The totality of these elements makes many think that sovereignty,

in today's age, "is at least, to a large extent, a mere idea, even a myth,
which has much to do sometimes with emotion, but little or nothing to do
with the reality
in the day-to-day life of the typical, present-day
153
government.

150. A great deal of human rights law has become part of customary international law, and
hence is binding on states even if those states may not have agreed to adhere to those norms.
151. Stacy, supra note 23, at 2036.
152. Examples of humanitarian intervention in recent years include the United Nations
intervention in Somalia, Haiti, and NATO intervention in Kosovo and its bombing of Yugoslavia,
on behalf of human rights.
153. Jennings, supra note 24, at 31-32.
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